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I.

INTRODUCTION

The Internal Revenue Code (the "Code") distinguishes the taxation of
residents and citizens from the taxation of nonresidents who are not citizens. The Code provides for a dual jurisdictional standard, imposing taxes
on residents or citizens of the United States.
For purposes of transfer taxes-estate1 and gift2 -decedents who were
residents or citizens3 are taxed on their worldwide assets,4 but nonresidents
who are not citizens incur transfer taxes only on assets situated in the
United States.5 For example, suppose a decedent's estate includes a house
in the United States and a house in France. If the decedent was a citizen or
resident of the United States, the decedent's estate must pay taxes on the
value of both houses. If the decedent was neither a citizen nor a resident-that is, a nonresident alien-the estate must pay taxes only on the value of
the house located in the United States.

* Trial Attorney, Office of the Associate Chief Counsel (International), Internal Revenue
Service, Washington, D.C.; M.L.T., Georgetown University, 1991; J.D.-M.B.A., Vanderbilt University, 1987; B.A., University of Kentucky, 1983. This Article reflects the view of Mr. Misey and
is not the opinion of the Internal Revenue Service or the Associate Chief Counsel (International).
The author would like to thank Edward J. Beckwith, Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center, for his thoughtful comments on previous drafts of this Article.
1. See I.R.C. subtit. B, ch. 11 (1988). All references are to the 1988 Code unless otherwise
indicated.
2. See I.R.C. subtit. B, ch. 12.
3. The Internal Revenue Code imposes an estate tax on the taxable estate of every citizen or
resident of the United States. I.R.C. § 2001(a).
4. For citizens or residents of the United States, the estate tax is based on the value of the
gross estate at the time of the decedent's death, and includes all property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, wherever situated. I.R.C. § 203 1(a).
5. For nonresident decedents who are not citizens of the United States, an estate tax will also
be imposed but only to the extent of the decedent's gross estate situated in the United States at the
time of the decedent's death. I.R.C. §§ 2101(a), 2103.
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Similarly, for income tax purposes, 6 residents and citizens are taxed on
their worldwide income wherever it is derived.7 However, nonresident
aliens are taxed only on their United States source income.8
The United States tax law provides two different definitions of residence.
Congress has never defined residence for transfer tax purposes, leaving in
place the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) regulatory interpretation of residence based on the subjective standard of domicile.9 However, after many
years of permitting the IRS to provide regulatory guidance, Congress in
1984 defined residence for income tax purposes by employing an objective
standard.'o Similarly, citizenship is a hybrid standard, containing elements
of a subjective and an objective standard.
A proper jurisdictional standard is important to planners and litigators.
It would conclusively determine, for example, whether the United States
has estate tax jurisdiction when a decedent had lived half of each year
abroad and half in the United States. The seminal case in this area is Estate
of Paquette v. Commissioner." In Paquette, a Canadian citizen lived in a
house he owned in Florida from October to April. After the sale of his
Canadian home, he no longer possessed living quarters in Canada and only
returned to Canada several months each summer to handle his investments
while living in a hotel during that period. In ruling for Paquette's estate,
the Tax Court strained to find that the decedent was a domiciliary of Canada by looking at numerous facts and circumstances to determine his intent. 2 As the following discussion of subjective standards will show, the
current standard of domicile causes problems. The time has come for Congress to legislate the proper jurisdictional standard for estate taxation.
This Article addresses what Congress should legislate as the proper jurisdictional standard for transfer tax purposes, analyzing the usefulness of
objective, subjective, and hybrid standards. Part II discusses the development of the dual standard of citizenship or domicile and the dearth of legislative history in this area. Part III reviews the policies common to all taxes
and those unique to transfer or international taxes and attempts to determine the goals that an international transfer tax jurisdiction standard
6. See I.R.C. subtit. A.
7. See Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47 (1924); see also I.R.C. §§ 861-863.
8. Nonresident aliens are taxed on their fixed, determinable annual, or periodic United States

source income at a fiat rate of 30%. I.R.C. § 871(a)(1). Income that is effectively connected with
the conduct of a trade or business within the United States is taxed at graduated rates. I.R.C.
§ 871(b)(1).
9. See Treas. Reg. § 20.0-1(b)(1) (1958).
10. See I.R.C. § 7701(b).
11. 46 T.C.M. (CCH) 1400 (1983).
12. The Tax Court did not make any findings regarding the decedent's visa status. Id.
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should attain. Part IV examines the possible jurisdiction of a subjective
standard based on domicile, an objective standard based on residence, and a
hybrid standard based on citizenship. Part V explains why the combination
of a hybrid standard and an objective standard is the proper international
jurisdictional standard for transfer tax purposes.
II.

THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF TRANSFER TAX JURISDICTION

Congress first distinguished the taxation of residents from nonresidents
and citizens from noncitizens when it legislated the income tax in the Revenue Act of 1913.13 Unfortunately, the Act and the legislative history14
failed to discuss the definition of resident, nonresident, citizen, and alien.
Congress renewed this scheme for income tax purposes in the 1916 Act 5
and promulgated the same distinction for the then newly enacted estate
tax. 6 The legislative history again failed to explain why Congress created
distinctions in its tax regime between resident and nonresident and between
17
citizen and alien.
For estate tax purposes, the IRS finally provided guidance in 1919 by
defining residence to be domicile. 8 The IRS adopted this definition from a
line of state transfer tax cases that deemed domicile to be the proper standard for a state's taxing jurisdiction.' 9 The reasoning behind this definition
of residence was that the state of domicile is the state that would have
power over the decedent's chattels.2" This original interpretation of domicile, with a few minor changes, continues as law under Treasury Regulation
13. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § IIA, 38 Stat. 166-67 (repealed 1916).
14. H.R. REP. No. 5, 63d Cong., 1st Sess. xxxvi-xxxix (1913).
15. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, §§ 1(a), 6(a), 39 Stat. 756, 760-61 (repealed 1918). Section
l(a) provided for an income tax on residents while Section 6(a) clarified that nonresident aliens
were not subject to tax on foreign source income. I&
16. Section 201 of the 1916 Act permitted a tax on the gross estate of both residents and
nonresidents. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 201, 39 Stat. 756, 777 (repealed 1918). The components of the gross estate for residents were set forth in Section 203(a)(1) while Section 203(b) set
forth the gross estate for nonresidents. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 203(a)(1), (b), 39 Stat.
756, 778 (repealed 1918).
17. H.R. REp. No. 922, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-5 (1916); S. REP. No. 793, 64th Cong., 1st
Sess. 5 (1916); COMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE, 64TH CONG., 1ST SESS., CONFERENCE REPORT ON
THE BILL (H.R. 16763) TO INCREASE THE REVENUE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES 8 (Comm.

Print 1916).
18. OFFICE OF COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, REGULATIONS 37 (revised, 1919)
(relating to Estate Tax Under the Revenue Act of 1918 art. 5, at 5 (1919)).
19. See, eg., Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398 (1939); Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U.S. 473
(1925).
20. Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U.S. 625, 631 (1916). The interpretation of residence as domicile withstood its first judicial challenge in Guaranty Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 25 B.T.A. 507,
512 (1932).
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section 20.0-1(b)(1). 2 1 Hereinafter, the term domicile will refer to the subjective definition of residence for transfer tax purposes, and the term residence will refer to the objective standard of residence for income tax
purposes.22
A consensus standard for transfer tax jurisdiction has yet to emerge
among treaty partners of the United States. Australia,2 3 France,2 4 Germany, 25 Greece, 26 Ireland, 27 Japan, 28 and the United Kingdom 29 use domicile as their jurisdictional standard. Conversely, Denmark 3' and the
21. The regulation states:
A person acquires a domicile in a place by living there, for even a brief period of time, with
no definite present intention of later removing therefrom. Residence without the requisite
intention to remain indefinitely will not suffice to constitute domicile, nor will intention to
change domicile effect such a change unless accompanied by actual removal.
Treas. Reg. § 20.0-1(b)(1) (1958).
In 1921, the IRS adopted the subjective standard for the income tax as well. See OFFICE OF
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, REGULATIONS 62 (1922 ed.) (relating to the Income
Tax and War Profits and Excess Profits Tax under the Revenue Act of 1921 art. 4, at 20 (1922)).
22. The IRS's subjective definition of residence continues in force with respect to transfer
(estate and gift) taxes. However, the IRS's subjective definition of residence as it applies to the
income tax has been supplanted by Congress's adoption of an objective standard. See supra notes
9-10 and accompanying text.
23. Jurisdiction in Australia for the estate tax is identical to jurisdiction for the gift tax. If the
decedent was domiciled in Australia, the estate would be taxed on all property, except real estate
located outside of Australia. If the decedent was domiciled outside Australia, the estate would be
taxed only on Australian situated property. INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM IN TAXATION,
HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, TAXATION IN AUSTRALIA 65-69, 75 (1958).
24. France imposes a succession tax on inheritees. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, INVENTORY OF TAXES LEVIED IN THE MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN COM-

MUNITIES 320-21 (13th ed. 1990).
25. Germany imposes an inheritance tax based on the domicile of the decedent. However,
Germany determines domicile by looking to the presence or absence of external and recognizable
facts rather than the decedent's intent. HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, TOPICAL LAW REPORTS: GERMANY (CCH) 703 & n.4 (1980).
26. Greece imposes an inheritance tax on legatees based on the domicile of the decedent. It
imposes the tax on all property situated in Greece owned by Greek domiciles and citizens as well
as their movable property located abroad, except where domiciled abroad for more than 10 years.
COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, supra note 24, at 218-19.
27. Ireland imposes a transfer tax on the recipient for the worldwide situated property of a
dispenser domiciled in Ireland and for any property located in Ireland regardless of domicile.
Income Tax Act (ITA) 1967 pt. ix, s.198, at 187-88 (1982).
28. A nondomiciliary pays only an inheritance tax on property situated in Japan. JOHN HUSTON ET AL., JAPANESE INTERNATIONAL TAXATION § 7.02[l] (1990).

29. The United Kingdom imposes an inheritance tax payable by the transferor on all property
located inside the United Kingdom, regardless of the transferor's domicile. COMMISSION OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, supra note 24, at 652.
30. If the deceased resided outside Denmark, the inheritance tax is payable only if the inheritance includes real estate or other property under Danish control. If neither the giver nor the
recipient is a resident of Denmark, the donor pays a gift tax only. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, supra note 24, at 84-85.
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Netherlands3 1 base their transfer tax jurisdiction on residence. Sweden3 2
uses a combination of residence and citizenship. Finally, Italy33 employs a
different scheme altogether, basing transfer taxes on situs instead of
nationality.34
Considering the diverse standards of United States treaty partners, there
is no compelling need for consistency in transfer tax jurisdiction. In addition, because Congress did not conclusively define its jurisdictional standards, the United States can start fresh, choosing the definition that best
interacts with the policies of international transfer tax objectives-whether
that definition is objective, subjective, or a hybrid.
III. THE POLICY CONCERNS OF TAXATION

One of the difficulties in formulating the proper jurisdictional standard
for international transfer tax purposes is the different and occasionally competing policy interests affecting the chosen standard. The analyst can divide
these policies into three categories: (1) policies that are general for all tax
purposes; (2) policies that are unique for transfer tax purposes; and (3) policies that are unique for international tax purposes.
A.

Policies Generalfor All Tax Purposes

Several policy considerations are not unique to transfer tax purposes or
international tax purposes, but are relevant for all tax purposes. To the
extent possible, when determining the proper jurisdictional standard for international transfer tax purposes, Congress should consider these policies.
Raising revenue is a policy underlying all taxation. Although the general consensus is that transfer taxes should act to redistribute wealth as
31. The Netherlands imposes succession duties (Successierechten). These are payable by recipients of gifts, inheritances, and legacies received from persons not residing in the Netherlands
on property located in the Netherlands. These duties are also imposed on an inheritance or gift
from a person residing in the Netherlands. Citizens who have not resided outside the Netherlands
for 10 years are treated for purposes of the transfer tax as residing in the Netherlands. Law on
Succession Duties 1956 (June 28, 1956) Stb. 546 (as amended in 1987 (Stb. 335)).
32. Sweden imposes a succession tax on recipients who are Swedish citizens or residents

wherever the property is located. In all other cases, Sweden imposes the succession tax only on
property situated in Sweden. The jurisdictional standard for the gift tax is identical. MARTIN
NORR ET AL., THE TAX SYSTEM IN SWEDEN 97-98 (1972).

33. Italy imposes a transfer tax on transfers of property located only in Italy when the decedent died. It is immaterial where the decedent died, resided, or had nationality. COMMISSION OF
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, supra note 24, at 462.
34. Italy imposes a death tax on all assets situated in Italy. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES, supra note 24, at 462. Such a regime is the antithesis of United States taxation of
worldwide assets. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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opposed to raising revenue, there is some opinion in Congress that the tax
writing committees should not propose laws which do not raise revenue.35
Another general policy is progressivity: taxing the wealthy at a greater
rate than the poor. In the Economic Recovery Act of 1981,36 Congress
endorsed progressive transfer taxes by increasing the exemption for transfer
37
taxes through an increase in the unified credit from $60,000 to $600,000.
Although income tax rates have lost some progressivity in recent years, 38 it
would be politically unpopular for Congress to make transfer taxes, which
try to redistribute wealth, regressive.
Another policy consideration is the usefulness of an objective test. Objective tests typically result in a trade-off between certainty and fairness. It
is a good way to eliminate the subjective standard of intent, which is hard to
plan for and even more difficult to litigate because of the inconsistent results
derived from case-by-case judicial determinations. 39 The certainty that
planning affords should favor tax determination, not tax avoidance. Objec4
tive tests also increase compliance and reduce administrative costs. 0
Opponents, however, say that objective tests are unfair and believe that
the law should foster fairness even at the cost of litigation, complexity, and
the lack of planning opportunities.4" They further argue that objective standards are advocated only by those who can use the standard to their tax
advantage. 42
35. During the legislation of the earnings stripping provision (I.R.C. § 163(j) of the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989), Rep. Dan Rostenkowski, Chairman of the House Ways and
Means Committee, indicated disfavor with resolving nonrevenue problems with fiscal solutions.
Tax Policy Aspects of Mergers and Acquisitions: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and

Means, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 2-9 (1989) (statements of Rostenkowski and Nicholas F. Brady,
Secretary of the Treasury).
36. Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
37. See I.R.C. § 2010(a). Tax policy makers can achieve progressivity by technical amendments as well as rate changes. JOINT COMM. ON THE ECONOMIC REPORT, 84TH CONG., IST
SEss., FEDERAL TAX POLICY FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH AND STABILITY 819, 838 (Joint Comm.
Print 1955) (papers submitted by panelists appearing before the subcommittee on tax policy).
38. For example, the top marginal rate has decreased from 50% in 1985 to 31% in 1990.
39. See, e.g., Stallforth v. Helvering, 77 F.2d 548 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 606
(1935); Hechavarria v. United States, 374 F. Supp. 128 (S.D. Ga. 1974); Park v. Commissioner, 79
T.C. 252 (1982), aff'd without op. sub. nom. Park v. C.I.R., 755 F.2d 181 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Brit-

tingham v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 373 (1976), aff'd, 598 F.2d 1375 (5th Cir. 1979); Dawson v.
Commissioner, 59 T.C. 264 (1972); Adams v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 352 (1966), acq. 1967-2 C.B.

1.
40. See

UNITED STATES TREASURY DEPT., A STUDY OF INTERCOMPANY PRICING

(White

Paper) 74 (1988), reprintedin 1988-49 I.R.B. 7-83, and in Standard Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH), extra
ed. No. 53 (Oct. 20, 1988).
41. David Williams, II, Back to the Future: A Time for Rethinking the Testfor Resident Alien
Status Under the Income Tax Laws, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 965, 1021 (1988).
42. UNITED STATES TREASURY DEPT., supra note 40, at 73.
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The advantages and disadvantages of objective tests are related to the
policy of simplicity. 3 Unfortunately, the policy of simplicity is hindered by
nontax policies that make Code provisions complex."
The proper legal development of a standard is also a policy concern. A
standard that lends itself to jurisprudential development is a better standard
than one that develops haphazardly or in a one-sided manner. If only one
party has an interest in a case's precedential value, that party will litigate
with a view toward developing the precedent in its favor.4 " However, if that
party litigates both sides of a dispute, it will not overstep its bounds when
arguing either side.
B. Policies Unique to Transfer Tax Purposes
Transfer taxes in the form of death taxes are the oldest method of
United States taxation, dating back to 1797.46 Death taxes were designed to
impose moral obligations on the wealthy to use their fortunes for social
purposes.47 In the nineteenth century, many people advocated death taxes
as a way to redistribute wealth.4 8 This redistribution of wealth theory
found popularity with the progressive policies of Theodore Roosevelt, who
did not believe that government should allow the wealthy to provide more
than a minimal amount to future generations.4 9 Supporters rationalized
that the idle rich were unproductive, that everyone should earn a living, and
that the United States should offer true equality of opportunity.50 The policy of redistribution is prevalent in the legislative history of the major transfer tax enactments. 5 1
Some commentators claim that death taxes are the price of the government's protection of property rights. They argue that death taxes are either
43. See Tax Law Simplification and Improvement Act of 1983: Hearing Before the House
Comm. on Ways andMeans, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 224 (1983) (statement of M. Bernard Aidinoff,
Chairman, Section of Taxation, American Bar Association, informing the Committee of the
ABA's proposal for defining a nonresident alien).
44. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 952(a)(3)(B) (pertaining to international boycotts).
45. Paul H. Rubin, Why is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGIS. STUD. 51, 53-55 (1977).
46. JoIr COMM. ON THE ECONOMIC REPORT, supra note 37, at 820-21. Initially, death
taxes were imposed by placing a stamp duty on legacies and intestate shares of personalty. Id.
47. JOSEPH A. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 234-35 (5th ed. 1987).
48. JOINT COMM. ON THE ECONOMIC REPORT, supra note 37, at 865.
49. JOINT COMM. ON THE ECONOMIC REPORT, supra note 37, at 825 (statement of Louis

Eisenstein regarding the rise and decline of the estate tax) (citing 17 WORKS OF THEODORE
ROOSEVELT 434 (1925)).
50. BORIS I. BITTKER & ELIAS CLARK, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION xxv (5th ed.
1984).
51. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 144, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 124 (1982) (The goal of estate taxation is
"to break up large concentrations of wealth.").
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a belated fee for the protection of private property during the decedent's
life5 2 or a fee for the use of the probate machinery to facilitate the transfer
of private property.13 Although ostensibly sound, both of these arguments
encounter difficulty in the international arena. They leave unanswered the
question of which country's government provides the protection.
Although the original purpose of the estate tax was to produce revenue
for World War I, revenue is not a major policy concern of transfer taxes."
Not only do transfer taxes generate less revenue than the income tax, but
transfer tax revenue pales in comparison to the revenue generated by any
other tax6
The policy of equity supports society's desire to impose the same tax on
estates of equal size.57 The equalizing treatment of spouses is seen in the
marital deduction, 8 which mitigates inequities created by community property laws. The credit for previously paid tax5 9 mitigates the inequity created when a legatee dies shortly after the decedent's estate paid estate tax on
the property transferred.
The proper standard should account for these transfer tax policies.
However, these policies will not adequately deal with the estates of decedents who have connections to more than one country.
C. Policies Unique for InternationalTax Purposes
Although international taxation does not have as strong and rich a tradition as transfer taxation, it has evolved quickly since the end of World
52. PECHMAN, supra note 47, at 234.
53. BITTKER & CLARK, supra note 50, at xxxii.
54. JOINT COMM. ON THE ECONOMIC REPORT, supra note 37, at 865 (recommendations of
Boris I. Bittker, Yale University, for revision of federal estate and gift taxes).
55. PECHMAN, supra note 47, at 235.
56. For example, the following data indicates revenue collected in billions of dollars for each
tax for the period beginning in fiscal year 1985 and ending in fiscal year 1990 (data is rounded to
the nearest billion).
Total
Income
Employment
Excise
Estate and
Revenue
Taxes
Taxes
Taxes
Gift Taxes
1985
743
474
225
37
7
1986
782
497
244
34
7
1987
886
568
277
33
8
1988
935
583
318
26
8

1989

1013

632

346

26

9

1990
1056
650
367
27
12
Data for the above table was derived from INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, STATISTICS OF INCOME BULLETIN 120 (1990).
57. PECHMAN, supra note 47, at 240.

58. I.R.C. § 2056.
59. I.R.C. § 2013.
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War II. 6 This has coincided with the growth of world trade exceeding the
growth of world output." The major international tax policy behind implementing an estate tax jurisdictional standard is compatibility with transfer
tax treaties.
Unlike many other countries, where treaties supersede the foreign country's domestic law, the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution6 2 treats federal legislation and treaties equally.6 3 Consequently, if a
treaty conflicts with legislation, the later enacted law will prevail." The
term "treaty override" describes legislation that conflicts with an earlier
enacted treaty.6 5 When determining whether a statute overrides a treaty,
the analyst should attempt to read the statute and treaty in harmony, viewing a subsequent statute as conflicting only if its terms clearly and distinctly
conflict with the treaty. 6 Although Supreme Court dictum has stated that
Congress has not breached treaty obligations unless there is a clear expression of intent,6 7 the intent shown in the legislative history is irrelevant when
a clear and distinct conflict exists between the language of the treaty and the
68
statute.
Treaty overrides do not limit the effect of the legislation, but they do
result in a loss of trust by treaty partners.6 9 This may have especially damaging effects when negotiating future tax treaties. Tax treaties represent a
careful balancing of interests. They confer benefits on both United States
60. For example, all of the current United States income or estate and gift tax treaties were
negotiated after 1945.
61. GERALD M. MEIER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS: THE THEORY OF POLICY 2 (1980).
62. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, § 2.
63. Interestingly, the Internal Revenue Code originally prohibited treaty overrides. In 1954,
Congress enacted Section 7852(d), which stated that no Code provision would contradict any
treaty obligation in effect upon enactment of the 1954 Code. Congress revised Section 7852(d) in
1988 to specify that neither treaties nor laws would receive priority. See I.R.C. § 7852(d).
64. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18 (1957) (citing Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888)).
65. The United States lawmaking procedure permits overrides because the lawmakers advancing the treaty are not the same lawmakers legislating the Code. The Treasury Department
negotiates tax treaties in consultation with the State Department. The President then forwards
the treaty to the Senate. After deliberations in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the full
Senate must give its advice and consent by a two-thirds vote. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cls. 1 & 2.
On the other hand, the House Ways and Means Committee originates tax legislation that must
pass the House before going to the Senate and its Finance Committee.
66. Robert J. Misey Jr., An Unsatisfactory Response to the InternationalProblem of Thin
Capitalization: Can Regulations Save the Earnings Stripping Provision?, 8 INT'L TAX & Bus.
LAW. 171 (1991).
67. Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 120 (1933), disapprovedof by United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992).
68. David Brockway, Override of Tax Treaties by OrdinaryLegislation, 34 BULL. FOR INT'L
FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 553 (1980).

69. Misey, supra note 66, at 171.
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decedents with foreign connections and foreign decedents with United
States connections. 7° By overriding tax treaties, tax legislation tilts the balance of interests. The foreign country will likely try to rebalance, hindering
71
the long-term economic and political interests of the United States.
Although the content of the eighteen United States transfer tax treaties
vary with the date of enactment,7 2 they all tend to follow the same general
principles. In treaties, two articles affect the United States jurisdiction of
international transfer taxes: the fiscal domicile article and the nondiscrimination article.
According to the fiscal domicile article, transfer taxes only apply to
domiciliaries and citizens7 3 as defined by each country's domestic law.7 4
The deference to each country's domestic law applies on the date of the
law's enactment,7 5 which should eliminate most override problems.
The jurisdictional standard, however, could override the nondiscrimination article. The relevant paragraph of the nondiscrimination article prevents the United States from taxing the estates of similarly situated foreign
citizens more burdensomely than the estates of United States citizens.76

70. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 42, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1989).
71. Id.
72. Compare Estate Tax Convention, Apr. 10, 1947, U.S.-S. Afr. with Estate and Gift Tax
Convention, Apr. 27, 1983, U.S.-Den.
73. U.S. Model Estate and Gift Tax Treaty, art. 1(1) (1977) in Tax Treaties (CCH) (1990)
[hereinafter 1977 Model Treaty]; U.S. Model Estate and Gift Tax Treaty, art. 1(1) (1980), in Tax
Treaties (CCH) (1990) [hereinafter 1980 Model Treaty].
74. Estate Tax Convention, May 14, 1993, U.S.-Austl., art. III(1), 5 U.S.T. 92, 95; Gift Tax
Convention, May 14, 1953, U.S.-Austl., art. III(1), 4 U.S.T. 2264, 2267; Estate and Gift Tax
Convention, Apr. 27, 1983, U.S.-Den., arts. 1(3), 4, T.I.A.S. 11082; Estate Tax Convention, Mar.
3, 1952, U.S.-Fin., art. III(1), 3 U.S.T. 4464, 4466; Estate, Gift, and Inheritance Tax Convention,
Nov. 24, 1978, U.S.-Fr., arts. 1(2), 4(1), 32 U.S.T. 1935, 1938, 1941; Estate and Gift Convention,
Dec. 3, 1980, U.S.-F.R.G., arts. 4(1), (5), T.I.A.S. 11082; Estate Tax Convention, Feb. 20, 1950,
U.S.-Greece, art. IV(1), 5 U.S.T. 12, 19; Estate Tax Convention, Sept. 13, 1949, U.S.-Ir., art.
III(1), 2 U.S.T. 2294, 2297; Estate Tax Convention, Mar. 30, 1955, U.S.-Italy, arts. III(1), (2), 7
U.S.T. 2977, 2980-82; Estate, Gift and Inheritance Convention, Apr. 16, 1954, U.S.-Japan, arts.
11(3), 111(1), 6 U.S.T. 113, 116-19; Estate and Inheritance Tax Convention, July 15, 1969, U.S.Neth., arts. 1, 4(1), 22 U.S.T. 247, 249, 251; Estate Tax Convention, June 13, 1949, U.S.-Nor.,
arts. III(1), (2), 2 U.S.T. 2353, 2355-56; Estate Tax Convention, Apr. 10, 1947, U.S.-S. Afr., art.
III(1), 3 U.S.T. 3792, 3798; Estate, Inheritance and Gift Taxation Convention, June 13, 1983,
U.S.-Sweden, arts. 1(1), 4(1), T.I.A.S. 10826; Estate Tax Convention, July 9, 1951, U.S.-Switz.,
art. IV(1), 3 U.S.T. 3972, 3975; Estate and Gift Tax Convention, Oct. 19, 1978, U.S.-U.K., art.
4(l)(a), 30 U.S.T. 7223, 7226.
75. 1980 Model Treaty, supra note 73, art. 4(1).
76. The language of the 1980 Model Treaty explains:
Citizens of a Contracting State, wherever they are resident, shall not be subjected in the
other contracting State to any requirement connected therewith which is other or more
burdensome than the taxation and connected requirements to which citizens of that other
State in the same circumstances are or may be subjected. However, for purposes of United
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Unfortunately, Congress and the IRS have traditionally strained their
interpretations to exclude almost all situations from being "similar
circumstances.""
Treaties are merely a tool to help eliminate double taxation and tax evasion, the goals of every transfer tax treaty.7 8 To this end, the proper jurisdictional standard will have one, and only one, country impose tax on the
estate of a decedent. When the United States does not have a treaty with a
foreign country, the United States grants a credit for transfer taxes paid to
that foreign country.7 9

The policy of collection is crucial to international taxation. Although
Congress has the power to impose a tax on transfers occurring anywhere in
the world,80 the IRS would undoubtedly encounter difficulty collecting the
tax. The United States cannot sue in a foreign court to collect a tax owed
because, under international law, one country will not enforce the revenue
laws of another country." Known as Lord Mansfield's Rule, 2 this princiStates taxation, United States citizens who are not residents of the United States are not in
the same circumstances as citizens ...who are not residents of the United States.
1980 Model Treaty, supra note 73, art. 10.
77. For example, when dealing with discrimination against residents of other countries, the
IRS has taken the view that it can treat foreign taxpayers differently than United States residents
because foreign residents do not pay a local tax on their worldwide income. H.R. CONF. REP. No.
386, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 568 (1989). However, Congress has shown concern about foreign
discrimination against United States citizens. In 1966, when liberalizing the estate taxation of
nonresident aliens in the Foreign Investors Tax Act (FITA), Congress passed I.R.C. Section 2108.
Section 2108, which Congress has not repealed, gives the President the power to eliminate any of
the liberalizing changes if he finds that United States citizens do not receive reciprocal concessions
from foreign countries. Removal of Tax Barriers to Foreign Investment in the United States:
Hearings on H.R. 5916 Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 21
(1965).
78. The preamble to every estate and gift tax treaty states that its purpose is to prevent both
double taxation and fiscal evasion.
79. I.R.C. § 2014. The foreign death tax credit, which does not affect treaty obligations,
takes effect when the United States imposes a tax on the entire estate and the foreign country
imposes a tax on property situated within that foreign country. S. REP. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st
Sess. 89 (1951); STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 92D CONG.,
1ST SESS., SUMMARY OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE REVENUE ACT OF 1951 (H.R. 4473) AS
AGREED TO BY THE CONFEREES 58 (1951).

80. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
31. Federal courts give effect to foreign money judgments. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S.
113, 163 (1895). But ef Bankston v. Toyota Motor Corp., 889 F.2d 172 (8th Cir. 1989); Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1986); Tahan v. Hodgson, 662 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
Federal courts do not enforce foreign tax money judgments. See United States v. Van der Horst,
270 F. Supp. 365 (Del. 1967); Newcomb v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 954 (1955), acq. 1955-2 C.B. 7.
82. The principle of international law that one country will not enforce the revenue laws of
another country may be traced to Lord Mansfield's dictum regarding national sovereignty that
"no country ever takes notice of the revenue laws of another." Hollman v. Johnson, 98 Eng. Rep.
1120, 1121 (K.B. 1775).
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ple is based on international sovereignty, and is enforced in the United
States against foreign countries83 and abroad against the United States."
For example, a United States court would not enforce an Australian transfer tax against shares of a corporation situated in Delaware.
There are, however, mutual collection articles contained in six of the
estate and gift tax treaties that provide for assistance in the collection of
taxes.85 These articles are found in the older treaties, the most recent of
which was ratified in 1979.86 Nevertheless, these articles are ineffective collection devices because they provide only for collecting from citizens of
third-party countries.8 7 Other than these mutual collection articles, there
are no known methods to collect United States taxes abroad.
The collection of income taxes is simple because the taxes are withheld
by the payor of the United States source income,88 thus ensuring collection
and minimizing the administrative burdens for taxpayers and the government. The withholding tax is the major source of revenue from foreign
investors. 89 However, withholding does not occur if the IRS determines
that the withholding requirements impose an undue administrative burden
and that an exemption will not jeopardize or delay the collection of tax. 9°

83. See cases cited supra note 81.
84. See, e.g., United States v. Harden, [1963] S.C.R. 366 (Can.). In Harden, British Columbia's Court of Appeals dismissed a United States suit for collection of taxes on a judgment obtained in a United States district court due to Lord Mansfield's Rule. Canada's Supreme Court
upheld the dismissal. Id.
85. Estate Tax Convention, Mar. 3, 1952, U.S.-Fin., arts. VIII-IX, 3 U.S.T. 4464, 4470; Estate, Gift, and Inheritance Tax Convention, Nov. 24, 1978, U.S.-Fr., art. 16, 32 U.S.T. 1935,
1958-59; Estate Tax Convention, Mar. 30, 1955, U.S.-Italy, art. VII, 7 U.S.T. 2977, 2984; Estate,
Gift, and Inheritance Tax Convention, Apr. 16, 1954, U.S.-Japan, art. VI(2), 6 U.S.T. 113, 123;
Estate Tax Convention, June 13, 1949, U.S.-Nor., art. IX (art. IX is not accepted by the U.S.), 2
U.S.T. 2353, 2358-59; Estate Tax Convention, Apr. 10, 1947, U.S.-S. Afr., art. VIII, 3 U.S.T.
3792, 3799.
86. Estate and Gift Tax Convention, Nov. 24, 1978, U.S.-Fr., art. 16, 32 U.S.T. 1935, 195859.
87. Collection assistance is not required for citizens of the country to which the creditor
country applies. However, for Norway and South Africa, the United States will collect from
citizens only if the estate receives a credit. Furthermore, for Finland and Italy, the United States
will collect from a citizen's estate to ensure that a country not entitled to a credit does not receive
it. See sources cited supra note 85.
88. The Internal Revenue Code provides that all persons having the control, receipt, custody,
disposal, or payment of any fixed, determinable annual, or periodic income shall deduct and withhold the applicable tax. I.R.C. § 1441(a), (b).
89. Task Force on Promoting Increased Foreign Investment in United States Corporate Securities and Increased Foreign Financing for United States Corporations Operating Abroad, Report to the President of the United States 23, reprintedin Legislative History of H.R. 13103, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. Foreign Investors Tax Act of 1966 (1967) (Henry H. Fowler, Chairman).
90. S. REP. No. 1707, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1083 (1966); 1966-2 C.B. 1059. Exceptions are
listed in I.R.C. § 1441(c).
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Another collection device the Code authorizes is a writ ne exeat republica.
This writ entitles the IRS to imprison a citizen who tries to leave the United
States to avoid payment of a tax on assessment. 91 Although the writ would
be ineffective in collecting estate taxes, it might be useful in collecting gift
92
taxes.
Another policy matter is the imposition of taxes based on the number
and extent of benefits conferred to the individual. 93 Thus, individuals who
received substantial and continuous benefits should pay more to the country's maintenance and operation than those who received minimal or infrequent benefits. 94 This policy deals directly with the jurisdictional issue of
classifying the number and extent of benefits conferred to noncitizens.
A few of these policies are competing. Although it might be difficult to
find a standard that satisfies all these policy concerns, the proper standard
should satisfy most of them.
IV.

THE POTENTIAL STANDARDS OF JURISDICTION

The Code contains three standards for taxing jurisdiction: domicile, a
subjective standard; residence, an objective standard; and citizenship, a hybrid of an objective standard with underlying subjectivity. Transfer taxes
currently contain a dual jurisdictional scheme of the subjective standard of
domicile or the hybrid standard of citizenship. The following discussion
analyzes the three different types of standards to determine if there are any
special nuances or intricacies that will help to develop the proper standard.
A.

The Subjective Standard of Domicile

Because the current United States transfer tax regime contains the subjective standard of domicile as one of its two jurisdictional standards,9 5 this
Article will initially review subjective standards. A subjective standard includes the unmanifested element of intent96 because the decedent's physical
presence alone is inconclusive.
91. I.R.C. § 7402(a).
92. The writ may even provide for a receiver to repatriate the assets necessary to ensure
collection. See United States v. Ross, 302 F.2d 831 (2d Cir. 1962). Although I.R.C. § 7402 does
not preclude issuing a writ to a citizen of a foreign country, such a writ and the subsequent
imprisonment could be considered an interference with international sovereignty.
93. David R. Tillinghast, A Matter of Definition: "Foreign" and "Domestic" Taxpayers, 2
INT'L TAX & Bus. LAW. 239, 240 (1984).
94. JOINT COMM. ON THE ECONOMIC REPORT, supra note 37, at 824 (statement of Louis
Eisenstein regarding the rise and decline of the estate tax.).
95. See Treas. Reg. § 20.0-1(b)(1) (1958).
96. JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 26 (3d ed. 1987)
(unmanifested intent is that which an individual believes).
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Legal theorists postulate that domicile is closely tied to the meaning of
home, as it is the country to which the individual intends to be connected.9 7
The subjective aspect of the domicile standard would indicate that it is the
place where an individual considers herself to be a member of society,
which would indicate the legal system, such as the transfer tax system, to
which the individual belongs.9 8
Domicile may change over the course of a person's life. An individual
acquires a domicile at birth-usually that of her parents. 99 Upon majority,
she acquires her domicile by being physically present in the new location
and by having the necessary intent to live there."o Upon acquiring a domicile, she retains it until acquiring another domicile elsewhere.11 In the absence of conflicting evidence, the analyst should presume that an existing
10 2
domicile continues until a challenger can prove otherwise.
Although the Code differentiates the transfer taxation of resident aliens
from nonresident aliens,10 3 the recently enacted objective standard of residence' 04 does not apply for transfer tax purposes."0 5 Instead, the standard
is, and has always been, domicile, which focuses on the intent and physical
presence elements. The regulations provide:
A person acquires a domicile in a place by living there, for even a
brief period of time, with no definite present intention of later removing therefrom. Residence without the requisite intention to remain indefinitely will not suffice to constitute domicile, nor will
intention to change domicile effect such a change unless accompanied by actual removal. 106
By including the word "intention," the IRS has created a subjective
standard.
Prior to the recent adoption of the objective standard of residence for
income tax purposes, some considered it easier to grapple with the definition of domicile than the former subjective standard of residence for income
97. Willis L.M. Reese & Robert S. Green, That Elusive Word, "Residence," 6 VAND. L. REV.
561, 562 (1953).
98. Elizabeth MacDonald, Domicile: Certaintyor Flexibility?, 135 NEW L.J. 865, 866 (1985).
99. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 14 (1971).
100. Id. § 15.
101. Weible v. United States, 244 F.2d 158, 163 (9th Cir. 1957).
102. Mitchell v. United States, 88 U.S. (Wall.) 350, 353 (1875); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 19 (1971).
103. Compare I.R.C. § 2001(a) with I.R.C. § 2101(a).
104. I.R.C. § 7701(b).
105. The definitions of resident alien and nonresident alien do not apply to subtitles B and C,
the estate and gift tax sections. See supra notes 9-10, 22 and accompanying text.
106. Treas. Reg. § 20.0-1(b)(1) (1958). For the gift tax, see Treas. Reg. § 25.2501-1(b)
(1958).
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tax purposes. 10 7 Because of the difficulty with the subjective definition of
domicile, courts have borrowed principles from state conflict of law cases
for transfer tax purposes.10 8 The decedent must have both intent and physical presence.10 9
1. Legal Intention to Make a Home

The subjective requirement of intent poses a problem in litigation. As
with all subjective standards, courts try to determine unmanifested signs of
intent by analyzing all the facts and circumstances. 110 The courts view nontax-related declarations 1 1 of the decedent's intent to make a home as having greater weight than tax-related declarations. 112
However, the subjective standard of intent can create problems when
nonpermanent visitors on a visa stay in the United States longer than they
are allowed.11 3 The resolution of this issue often turns on the legal capacity
of the alien. An alien must have the requisite intent to establish domicile,
but one cannot have the requisite intent without the legal capacity to do so.
A minor, for example, is not competent to form the requisite intent to establish domicile and adopts her parents' domicile. 14 However, a person has
the legal capacity to form the requisite intent if she can make an informed,
intelligent decision, regardless of whether she can be ordered to go else107. See Joel Karp, Definition of Citizenship, Residence and Domicile for US. Income, Gift
and Estate Tax Purposes,43d N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX, ch. 13, § 13.04 (1985).
108. See, e.g., Rodiek v. Commissioner, 33 B.T.A. 1020 (1936), aff'd sub. nom. Rodiek v.
Helvering, 87 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1937).
109. Treas. Reg. § 20.0-1(b)(1) (1958).
110. Rodiek, 33 B.T.A. at 1033-34. In Rodiek, the Board of Tax Appeals ruled that because
the taxpayer never lived on U.S. real estate and merely used it as an investment, he did not have
sufficient intent to live in the United States. Id.; see also Commissioner v. Nubar, 185 F.2d 584
(4th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 925 (1951).
111. See Paquette v. Commissioner, 46 T.C.M. (CCH) 1400 (1983).
112. See Vriniotis v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 298 (1982).
113. See In re Lok, 15 I. & N. Dec. 720 (B.I.A. 1976), remandedsub. nom. Lok v. INS, 548
F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1977), on remand, 16 1. & N. Dec. 441 (B.I.A. 1978), laterproceeding,18 I. & N.
Dec. 101 (B.I.A. 1981), aff'd on other grounds, Lok v. INS, 681 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1982), which
interprets 8 U.S.C. § 1212(c) to require seven years of residence in the United States for domicile.
Thus, it is possible for a person to have domicile in the United States even though the person is an
illegal alien. It should be noted, however, that Lok was modified by a subsequent Eleventh Circuit
case. See Marti-Xiques v. INS, 741 F.2d 350 (1lth Cir. 1984). Lok has also been disagreed with
by Cabasug v. INS, 847 F.2d 1321 (9th Cir. 1988); Variamparambil v. INS, 831 F.2d 1362 (7th
Cir. 1987); and Moreno v. INS, 779 F.2d 1086 (5th Cir. 1986).
114. American Home Benefit Ass'n v. United Am. Benefit Ass'n, 125 P.2d 1010 (Idaho
1942); 1 JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 10.2 (1935); SAMUEL
WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 222 (Walter H.E. Jaeger ed., 3d ed.
1959).
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where.11 Thus, an alien has the legal capacity to form the intent to acquire
domicile even when the immigration laws prevent her from permanently
16
living in the United States.1
In Elkins v. Moreno, 11 7 an alien possessing a G-4 temporary visa, which
is for the immediate family members of an international organization employee, 1" tried to obtain educational benefits available only to domiciliaries
of Maryland. The Supreme Court decided that a holder of a G-4 visa had
the legal capacity to acquire domicile in the United States. 9 The Court
first found that if an alien under a G-4 visa terminates her employment
with an international treaty organization, both she and her family will lose
their immigration status under section G-4; but, they *ill not necessarily be
subject to deportation or have to leave and re-enter the country in order to
become immigrants again. 12 0 The Court rationalized that, unlike other visa
holders, G-4 visa holders could establish domicile in the
United States be12
1
elsewhere.
home
a
establish
to
have
not
cause they did
Although the Court, in dictum, implied that holders of other types of
visas did not have the requisite legal capacity, the IRS clarified its position
in two Revenue Rulings based on Elkins.122 Increasing the estate tax revenue base, the IRS ruled that someone who has never gained the right to be
in the United States still has the requisite legal capacity because that person
is subject to the same risk of deportation as someone who holds a temporary visa but overstays her welcome. 123
115. Rev. Rul. 80-209, 1980-2 C.B. 248. In Stifel v. Hopkins, 477 F.2d 1116, 1120 (6th Cir.
1973), the court held that a prisoner has the necessary legal capacity to form the intent to live
elsewhere. In Ellis v. Southeast Constr. Co., 260 F.2d 280 (8th Cir. 1958), the court ruled that a
member of the armed services has the necessary legal capacity to form the intent to live elsewhere.
116. This would apply if, for example, she does not qualify to obtain a green card. See infra
note 172.
117. 435 U.S. 647 (1978).
118. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(g)(2) (1992); 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(15)(G)(iv) (1988).
119. In an earlier case, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals had also ruled that an illegal
alien could possess the intent necessary for lawful domicile. See Lok v. INS, 681 F.2d 107 (2d Cir.
1982); Lok v. INS, 548 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1977). For the full history of this case, see supra note 113.
120. Elkins, 435 U.S. at 666-67.
121. Id.
122. See Rev. Rul. 80-363, 1980-2 C.B. 249; Rev. Rul. 80-209, 1980-2 C.B. 248. Revenue
Ruling 80-363 revoked Rev. Rul. 74-364, 1974-2 C.B. 321, which stated that the holder of a G-4
visa was under a legal disability such that she could not form the requisite intent to remain indefinitely in the United States.
123. See sources cited supra note 122.
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Physical Presence

Intent without physical presence is not enough to establish domicile. 2 4
Like intent, the physical presence requirement is based on facts and circumstances. Unlike the intent requirement, courts do not use facts and circumstances to determine what the decedent was thinking. The IRS has ruled
that to establish domicile, an alien must perform an affirmative act to establish physical presence in the United States. Absence from the country of
original domicile is not enough.' 25 In another ruling, the IRS listed factors
that show physical presence. These include the location of the alien's permanent job, any church membership, declarations in the alien's will, and
the location of the bulk of the alien's estate.' 2 6 In addition, the IRS looks to
the alien's ties to the local community, the location of any homes the alien
owns, and the period of time the alien lived with her family in the United
States."' Many of these factors are also used to analyze physical presence
under the former subjective standard of residence for income tax
8
purposes. 12
The major advantage of a subjective test is that it offers flexibility to
otherwise rigid rules.' 29 In this manner, the subjective standard provides
equity by accounting for the special characteristics of each individual taxpayer.13 0 For example, in Nienhuys v. Commissioner,131 the decedent was a
domiciliary of the Netherlands travelling out of the Netherlands when
World War II began. Because of the War, he lived in the United States and
was unable to return to the Netherlands before dying in the United States in
1946. The Court ruled that the decedent, at death, was a domiciliary of the
Netherlands, providing a result that an inflexible standard could not
provide.
124. In re Dorrance's Estate, 163 A. 303 (Pa. 1932), cert. denied sub. nom. Dorrance v. Pennsylvania, 287 U.S. 660 (1932) and 288 U.S. 617 (1933).
125. Rev. Rul. 58-70, 1958-1 C.B. 341. The IRS cited Mitchell v. United States, 88 U.S. 350,
353 (1874), for the proposition that absence from a foreign home is not enough of a physical
presence to establish domicile. Rev. Rul. 80-209, 1980-2 C.B. 248.
126. Rev. Rul. 80-209, 1980-2 C.B. 248.
127. d The ruling cited Farmer's Loan & Trust Co. v. United States, 60 F.2d 618 (S.D.N.Y.
1932). It also cited the Special Note on Evidence for Establishmentof a Domicile on Choice,following RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 20, at 20 (1971).
128. See Fokker v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. 1225 (1948), acq. 1943-2 C.B. 2; Rev. Rul. 58-70,
1958-1 C.B. 341.
129. Stephen J. McGarry, Student Paper, State ofMind Standardsin Taxation, 7 AM. J. TAX
POL'Y 249, 303 (1988).

130. Lawrence G. Van Horn, The Need for More Objective Tax Laws, 51 TAXES 589, 596
(1973).
131. 17 T.C. 1149 (1952).
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Despite the lack of a discernible causal connection, the use of the subjective standard of domicile correlates with the policy of redistribution of
wealth. A 1990 poll indicates that the majority of billionaires were self132
made individuals who did not inherit their money.
There are, however, many problems with using the subjective standard
of domicile for transfer tax purposes. The subjective standard of domicile is
vague and uncertain,1 33 which is evident in the multitude of cases on the
issue of proper domicile. 3 4 Aiens will not necessarily know the ramifications of tax laws because the regulation's definition does not provide clear
guidance for possible transfer tax liability. The courts determine both intent and physical presence on a case-by-case basis, 135 making it virtually
impossible for a reasonable person to plan for her expected estate tax liability. This is aggravated by the IRS's reluctance to rule on transfer tax is1 37
sues. 136 Congress has provided certainty to income tax planners;
1 38
Congress should now provide certainty to transfer tax planners as well.
Not only is determining intent difficult, but basing United States domicile on living in the United States "for even a brief period of time" 139 is
unjust. Because transfer taxes are based on an individual's accumulated
wealth, it is improper and overreaching for the United States to claim transfer taxes from an individual living in the United States for only a brief period of time who has not manifested an intent to live in the United States
through an objective act. For example, consider a slight variation of the
Paquette"4 facts with a wealthy Canadian citizen. When the Canadian citi132. Less than a third of all billionaires inherited their wealth. The Richest People in
America: The Forbes 400, FORBES (Special Fall 1990 Issue), Oct. 22, 1990, at 318-27 [hereinafter
The Richest People in America].

133. Tax Law Simplification and Improvement Act of 1983, supra note 43, at 221.
134. See, e.g., Paquette v. Commissioner, 46 T.C.M. (CCII) 1400 (1983); Nienhuys v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1149 (1952); Rev. Rul. 80-363, 1980-2 C.B. 250; Rev. Rul. 80-209, 1980-2 C.B.
248; Rev. Rul. 74-364, 1974-2 C.B. 321. The lead cases under the former subjective standard for
the income tax pursuant to Treas. Reg. § 1.871-2 are cited supra note 39. The problem with
subjective standards is not limited to the United States. For United Kingdom cases, see Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Bullock, 51-1 T.C. 522 (Ch. 1975); Fielden v. Commissioners of
Inland Revenue, 42 T.C. 501 (Ch. 1965); Faye v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, 40 T.C. 103
(Ch. 1961).
135. Rodiek v. Commissioner, 33 B.T.A. 1020, 1033-34 (1936).
136. See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 89-3, 1989-1 C.B. 763; Rev. Proc. 88-50, 1988-2 C.B. 711.
137. See I.R.C. § 7701(b).
138. See James A. Fellows, Alien Taxpayers and Estate and Gift Taxation After the Tax Reform Act of 1984: A CriticalResponse, 62 TAXES 751, 752 (1984).
139. Treas. Reg. § 20.0-1(b) (1958) (estate tax); Treas. Reg. § 25.2501-1(b) (1958) (gift tax);
see also supra note 106 and accompanying text.
140. Paquette v. Commissioner, 46 T.C.M. (CCH) 1400 (1983); see supra notes 11-12 and
accompanying text.
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zen reaches the age of sixty-five, he purchases a condominium in Florida
and lives there every January. At seventy-five, he sells his Canadian home
in the fall and travels to Florida. He dies a month later. If the decedent's
estate cannot prove his intent to live in Canada, his entire estate, wherever
located, will be subject to tax in the United States based on his brief presence in the United States.14 1 This seems quite inequitable. After all, if the
decedent's activities have enough of a connection to the United States, the
United States can impose an income tax through the objective standard of
residency.14 2 However, it is inequitable to impose the estate tax on his lifelong accumulation of wealth.' 4 3 The United States should not be able to
claim taxation of the worldwide assets of an individual who has not objectively desired to take advantage of the benefits that the United States offers.
The standard needs the formulation of objective criteria to determine substantial physical presence. Combined with the subjective element of intent,
physical presence for an unspecified time is incapable of serving as an adequate standard.
Domicile is a difficult standard to apply in a modem, mobile, and industrialized society. With people moving easily from one country to another,'" multiple countries could subjectively assert that the decedent
domiciled herself in their country despite an insufficient connection between
the decedent and the country. 4 5 In the interests of certainty, the present
standard of domicile unreasonably requires that an individual sever all ties
with a country when relocating. Such a requirement raises further
problems. If an individual moves to a different country for a new job that
she discovers she does not like, then returns to her original country and
dies, the country of residence is unclear. It also hurts the global business of
United States industry, which needs qualified personnel to relocate. Furthermore, a subjective definition was more suitable in the 1920s and 1930s,
when travel to the United States was rare. But today, travel is easier; a
European can reach the United States in several hours. 146
141. I.R.C. § 2001(a); Treas. Reg. § 20.0-1(b)(1) (1958). Furthermore, there is no transfer
tax treaty between Canada and the United States.
142. See Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 262 (1967).
143. JOINT COMM. ON THE ECONOMIC REPORT, supra note 37, at 855, 857 (economic effects
of cztate and gift taxation by C. Lowell Harriss, Columbia University).
144. For example, the ease of travelling throughout the EEC has never been easier.
145. Denis Sheridan, Private InternationalLaw: The Law of Domicile: Observations on the
Joint Report, 1989 BRIT. TAX. REv. 230, 236.
146. See Tax Law Simplification and Improvement Act of 1983, supra note 43, at 223.
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Many of the fifty states use a definition of domicile to impose transfer
taxes. 14 7 However, the subjective definition of domicile is necessary for
states to differentiate allegiance because they do not have a concept similar
to citizenship, which is a national concept.
The use of a subjective standard of domicile produces mixed results
when interacting with transfer tax treaties. Domicile does not override, but
it has limited usefulness.. The purpose of transfer tax treaties is to ensure
the collection of a single death tax by avoiding double taxation and prevent148
ing tax evasion.
Because each country applies its domestic law to determine domicile, an
individual may find herself in the predicament of possessing multiple domiciles, and therefore subject to estate taxation in multiple countries unless
protected by a treaty. For example, if an individual intends to live in the
United States, where she has a winter home in Florida, but spends her summers in the Netherlands, which has an objective standard, 149 her estate
would be subject to tax in both countries. Although the newer treaties provide for tiebreakers in case of double domicile, the tiebreakers have limited
effectiveness.
A special tiebreaker rule applies if an individual is a double domiciliary,
but a citizen of one country. The individual is domiciled in the country of
citizenship if she has not lived in the other country for seven of the last ten
years. In all other cases, the analyst should consider the following in determining the country of domicile: (1) the permanent home of the decedent;
(2) the center of the decedent's vital interests; (3) the habitual abode of the
decedent; (4) the citizenship of the decedent; and (5) the mutual agreement
of the competent authorities of the two countries.'5 0
These tiebreaking procedures for determining domicile are inadequate.
First, although the newer treaties contain the tiebreakers, there are eleven
older treaties that do not have a tiebreaker article.'5 1 Second, the tiebreak-

147. White v. United States, 511 F. Supp. 570 (S.D. Ind. 1981), aff'd, 680 F.2d 1156 (7th Cir.

1982); see also, CAL. REV. & TAX. § 14,199 (West 1991); FLA. STAT. § 198.01(6) (1991); N.Y.
TAX LAW § 605(b)(1)(A) (McKinney 1991).
148. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
149. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.

150. Estate and Gift Tax Convention, Nov. 24, 1978, U.S.-Fr., art. 4(2), 32 U.S.T. 1935,
1941-42; Estate and Gift Tax Convention, Dec. 3, 1980, U.S.-F.R.G., art. 4(2), T.I.A.S. 11082;
Estate Tax Convention, July 15, 1969, U.S.-Neth., art. 4(3), 22 U.S.T. 247, 252; Estate and Gift
Tax Convention, June 13, 1983, U.S.-Swed., art. 4(3), T.I.A.S. 10826; Estate and Gift Tax Convention, Oct. 19, 1978, U.S.-U.K., art. 4(4), 30 U.S.T. 7223, 7227.

151. These older treaties generally avoid the determination of which country has jurisdiction
by granting a credit based on the proportionate value of the property. Estate Tax Convention,
May 14, 1953, U.S.-Austl., art. V(2), 5 U.S.T. 92, 98; Gift Tax Convention, May 14, 1953, U.S.-
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ing standards themselves are troublesome. Treaty negotiators could improve the special tiebreaker by eliminating the seven year standard and
deeming domicile to be the country of citizenship. The first four on the list
are difficult to ascertain because they are undefined in any of the treaties.
Fortunately, the analyst can usually determine citizenship by a country's
local law. The final tiebreaker, agreement by the competent authorities,
does not guarantee a single domicile and is irreconcilable with the policy of
certainty. The Treasury Department could simplify these tiebreakers by
proposing citizenship as the ultimate tiebreaker. Even with improvements,
however, the tiebreakers do not provide a means to eliminate disputes between multiple countries claiming domicile, because the treaties are only
bilateral. By eliminating intent, the proper jurisdictional standard would
help eliminate many double taxation problems.
Moreover, a subjective standard may actually result in the evasion of
any transfer tax from any country. If both competing countries define domicile using a subjective standard similar to the United States standard, and
the individual does not intend to remain indefinitely in either country, she
will avoid being taxed altogether. Such a scenario would be likely in the
case of an alien who spends winters in Australia and summers in the United
States.
Because the many disadvantages of subjective standards outweigh the
advantages of flexibility and equity, Congress should eliminate the domicile
standard.
B.

The Objective Standardof Residence

An objective standard determines an outcome by looking at the facts
without any regard to unmanifested intent.' 5 2 Furthermore, the word residence usually connotes a physical connection to a community, such as liv1 53
ing there for a fixed period of time, which is an objective determination.
The Code's definition of residence for income tax purposes has evolved
Austl., art. 5(2), 4 U.S.T. 2264, 2270; Estate Tax Convention, Mar. 3, 1952, U.S.-Fin., art. V(3), 3
U.S.T. 4464, 4469; Estate Tax Convention, Feb. 20, 1950, U.S.-Greece, art. VI(2), 5 U.S.T. 12, 25;
Estate Tax Convention, Sept. 13, 1949, U.S.-Ir., art. V(2), 2 U.S.T. 2294, 2299; Estate, Gift, and
Inheritance Tax Convention, Apr. 16, 1954, U.S.-Japan, art. V(2), 6 U.S.T. 113, 120-21; Estate
Tax Convention, June 13, 1949, U.S.-Nor., art. V(2), 2 U.S.T. 2353, 2357; Estate Tax Convention,
Apr. 10, 1947, U.S.-S. Afr., art. V(2), 3 U.S.T. 3792, 3797-98.
152. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 96, at 26. An objective manifestation of intent is

determined from what a party says and does. Unlike unmanifested intent, manifestations of an
individual's intent are satisfactory indicators because they are based on an objective analysis of the
facts shown to others. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 96, at 26.
153. Reese & Green, supra note 97, at 568.
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from a subjective standard similar to domicile to an objective standard
based on physical presence.
The theory behind basing taxation on physical presence is that those

physically present obtain more continuous and significant benefits and protection from the laws and the government than do those not physically

present. For this reason, such individuals should contribute proportionately more to the government's maintenance and operation. Although
under the current standards an alien could have United States residence for
income tax purposes but domicile elsewhere,154 nothing in the legislative
histories indicates that the residence standard for transfer tax purposes
must differ from the residence standard for income tax purposes.
Since the origination of the income tax in 191315 until 1984, Congress
never defined the term residence for income tax purposes. However, the
IRS defined residence in 1921156 for income tax purposes as a subjective
standard of physical presence with an intention to stay in the United
States.1 57 The former subjective standard of residence depended on
whether the alien was a mere transient or sojourner in the United States.
Living in the United States without any definite intention as to the duration
and nature made the alien a resident pursuant to the regulations.' 58

154. Bowring v. Bowers, 24 F.2d 918, 921 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 277 U.S. 608 (1928).
155. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § A, 38 Stat. 114 (repealed 1916).
156. Treas. Reg. § 62 (1921), which on Oct. 23, 1957, became Treas. Reg. § 1.871-2. T.D.
6258, 1957-2 C.B. 368.
157. Treas. Reg. § 1.871-2(b) (1957) stated:
An alien actually present in the United States who is not a mere transient or sojourner is a
resident of the United States for purposes of the income tax. Whether he is a transient is
determined by his intentions with regard to the length and nature of his stay. A mere
floating intention, indefinite as to time, to return to another country is not sufficient to
constitute him a transient. If he lives in the United States and has no definite intention as
to his stay, he is a resident. One who comes to the United States for a definite purpose
which in its nature may be promptly accomplished is a transient; but, if his purpose is of
such a nature that an extended stay may be necessary for its accomplishment, and to that
end the alien makes his home temporarily in the United States, he becomes a resident,
though it may be his intention at all times to return to his domicile abroad when the
purpose for which he came has been consummated or abandoned....
158. Treas. Reg. § 1.871-2(b) (1957). In addition, the regulations created a rebuttable presumption that aliens were nonresidents. Treas. Reg. § 1.871-4(b), (c) (1957). Treas. Reg. § 1.8714(c)(1) indicated that someone limited to a definite period of time in the United States cannot have
a residence absent exceptional circumstances. Later, the IRS issued Rev. Rul. 69-611, 1969-2
C.B. 150, which states that residence in the United States for one year raises the presumption that
the alien was a resident for United States income tax purposes. Furthermore, the IRS ruled that
temporary visas indicated nonresident status. Rev. Rul. 67-159, 1967-1 C.B. 280; Rev. Rul. 64285, 1964-2 C.B. 184; see also Siddiqi v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 553 (1978); Escobar v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 304 (1977), acq. in result, in part, 1978-2 C.B.
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Despite both standards having a subjective element, the Tax Court
stated that the former subjective standard of residence for income tax purposes was not synonymous with domicile. 15 9 Nevertheless, it was difficult
to see how the facts and circumstances approach used by the courts in cases
dealing with the former subjective standard of residence for income tax purposes differed from those of domicile."6
When Congress convened in 1984,161 six reasons prompted its decision
to change residence for income tax purposes from a subjective to an objective standard. First, it recognized the need for an objective standard to
provide guidance to planners. Although Congress knew that an objective
standard would impose residency on "true" nonresidents, it thought that
1 62
the cost of unfairness would be worth the benefits of certainty.
Second, Congress believed that it should tax only aliens whose relationship with the United States was so close that inclusion of worldwide income
was appropriate. In so doing, Congress would tax resident aliens on their
worldwide income because some were wealthy individuals who resided in
the United States only for the benefits of political stability or economic
163
opportunities.
Third, Congress believed that aliens who had entered the United States
as permanent residents pursuant to lawful acquisition and possession of a
green card should be taxed as United States residents. Its analysis was that
because these resident aliens had the same rights as citizens, they should
1
contribute as much to the cost of running the government. "
Fourth, Congress thought that an objective test of an individual spending a certain arbitrary amount of time would be sufficient to impose a
159. Park v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 252, 287 (1982), aff'd without op., 755 F.2d 181

(D.C.

Cir. 1985); Maclean v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 1045, 1054 (1980).
160. See Schoneberger v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1016, 1023 (1980); Maclean, 73 T.C. at
1054.
161. After the House of Representatives passed the bill containing the origins of I.R.C.
§ 7701(b), the Senate did not make any amendments. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 966 (1984). The Conference Committee followed the House version with few modifications.
Id. at 967.
162. H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 1523 (1984); JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION STAFF, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 463 (Joint Comm. Print 1984).

163. H.R. REP.

No. 432, supra note 162, at 1524-25; JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION STAFF,

supra note 162, at 465.
164. H.R. REP. No. 432, supra note 162, at 1524; JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION STAFF, supra
note 162, at 464.
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tax. 16 5 However, certain 1policies
based on international trade and law
66
would result in exceptions.
Fifth, although desiring objectivity, Congress did not want aliens to
change their residency status back and forth to accommodate changes in
67
tax planning whims.1
Finally, Congress was concerned about compliance and administrative
problems of the IRS. 6 ' In Park v. Commissioner,169 a Korean businessman
maintained a presence in the United States for more than twenty years. He
owned several U.S. homes, operated businesses in the United States, was
socially prominent in the United States, and spent over half of each year in
the United States. Although the Tax Court ultimately agreed with the IRS
that the taxpayer was a resident, Congress was concerned about the IRS
wasting resources on trying to prove that someone living over half his life in
the United States was a resident. 170 Congress was not moved, however, by
the Paquette171 case, which involved the avoidance of domicile.
There are two tests by which the IRS may deem a taxpayer to have
become a resident subject to tax on worldwide income: the green card test,
also known as lawful permanent residence, 172 and the substantial presence
test. 173 These tests are purely objective; analysts can determine them without regard to unmanifested intent.
The green card test 7 4 is the easier of the two tests to apply. It simply
provides that an individual is a resident if he holds a green card to live in
the United States at any time during the calendar year. 175 It derives its
nickname from the color of the cardboard on which the United States first
165. H.R. REP. No. 432, supra note 162, at 1524; JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION STAFF, supra
note 162, at 464.
166. H.R. REP. No. 432, supra note 162, at 1524; JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION STAFF, supra
note 162, at 464.
167. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION STAFF, supra note 162, at 465.
168. H.R. REP. No. 432, supra note 162, at 1523; JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION STAFF, supra

note 162, at 463.
169. 96 T.C. 252 (1982), aff'd without op., 755 F.2d 181 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
170. Id.
171. Paquette v. Commissioner, 46 T.C.M. (CCH) 1400 (1983); see also supra notes 11-12
and accompanying text.
172. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(1)(A)(i).
173. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(1)(A)(ii).
174. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(1)(A)(i). Green cards are on INS Form 1-551. 8 C.F.R. § 264.1(b)
(1992).
175. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(1)(A)(i).
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issued visas.176 The IRS had previously
ruled that green card status was
177
residence.
of
determinative
not
The green card test imposes resident alien status on holders of a green
card who rarely come to the United States but who retain their green card
status as a hedge against economic or political problems abroad. The policy
underlying the test is that an alien should not be able to enter the United
178
States whenever she wishes while avoiding tax on her worldwide income.
The green card test is an outward manifestation of intent because, by definition, when the alien obtains the green card she is showing to all that she
intends to live permanently in the United States.179 Therefore, the test is
1 80
reflective of factual situations.
Although an individual may obtain her green card prior to being present
in the United States," 1 her residence does not begin until she is present in
the United States. 8 2 The alien must be present in the United States at least
one day each year to maintain a green card. 183 If the alien returns her green
card or the State Department appropriates it, the alien is no longer a resident for income tax purposes.184 Unmanifested intent is irrelevant to green
card procedures.
18 5
The second and more complicated test is the substantial presence test,
which mechanically calculates residence on the various numbers of days an
individual is present in the United States. A person is a resident of the
United States under the substantial presence test 186 if: (1) physical presence
18 7
in the United States is at least 31 days during the current calendar year,
and (2) computed presence exceeds 183 days, using a formula that counts
176. Interview with Glen Keiser, Advisor to the U.S. Consulate, in Tijuana, Mexico (Mar. 9,
1991).
177. Rev. Rul. 76-82, 1976-1 C.B. 192.
178. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION STAFF, supra note 162, at 467.

179. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) (1988).
180. Tax Law Simplification and Improvement Act of 1983, supra note 43, at 371 (statement
of representatives from Price Waterhouse, an accounting firm).
181. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION STAFF, supra note 162, at 472.

182. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(2)(A)(ii). But if she is a resident the previous year under the substantial presence test, the presence is continuous. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(2)(A)(iii).
183. 8 C.F.R. § 211.1(b) (1992). However, an alien may obtain a re-entry permit (Form I327) that will extend the green card's validity for an additional year while the alien is abroad. See
8 U.S.C. § 1203 (1988).
184. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(6)(B); see also H.R. REP. No. 432, supra note 162, at 1530; JOINT
COMM. ON TAXATION STAFF, supra note 162, at 471. If, however, the alien stayed in the U.S.

anyway, she could satisfy the substantial presence test thereby making her residence continuous.
See I.R.C. § 7701(b)(2)(A)(iii).
185. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(1)(A)(ii).
186. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(3)(A).
187. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(3)(A)(i).
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days present in the current year as one day, days present in the preceding
year as one-third of a day, and days present two years prior to the current
year as one-sixth of a day. 8'
Suppose an alien is present in the United States for 120 days in year one
and 120 days in year two. If she is present in the United States for only 123
days in year three, she is not a resident under the substantial presence test
because the formula results in only 183 days.' 8 9 But, if she was present in
the United States for 124 days in year three, the formula would yield 184
days,' 9 0 which results in residence.
The substantial presence test is actually much more complicated than
shown in the previous example because it allows for numerous exceptions.
The "closer connection" exception' denies residence if an alien (1) is present in the United States for less than 183 days during the current year, (2)
has a closer connection to a foreign country than to the United States, and
(3) has his tax home' 92 in the foreign country. 9 ' A de minimis exception is
designed to avoid the substantial presence test when the alien is in the
United States for administrative tasks, such as closing the purchase or sale
of a home.'9 4 In counting the number of days for the substantial presence
188. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(3)(A)(ii).

189.
1st year:
2nd year:
3rd year:

120 days x one-sixth
120 days x one-third
123 days x 1

=
=

20
40
= 123
183 days
Because the total does not exceed 183 days, the alien is not a resident.
190.
Ist year:
120 days X one-sixth = 20
2nd year: 120 days X one-third = 40
3rd year: 124 days X 1
= 124
184 days
Here, the total exceeds 183 days and, therefore, the alien would be considered a resident.
191. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(3)(B).
192. I.R.C. § 911(d)(3) defines a tax home and should be read in conjunction with I.RC.
§ 162.
193. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(3)(B)(ii). Congress expected that this three-part test would be difficult
to meet. H.R. REP. No. 432, supra note 162, at 1524. Toward this goal, Section 7701(b) denies
this exception if the alien has an application for adjustment of status pending (I.R.C.
§ 7701(b)(3)(C)(i)) or has taken other steps to obtain a green card (I.R.C. § 7701(b)(3)(C)(ii)),
such as filing a Biographic Information form with the Department of State (a Biographic Information form is Immigration and Naturalization Form G-325A). H.R. REP. No. 432, supra note 162,
at 1527; see also JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION STAFF, supra note 162, at 464-68. Congress also
expected the Secretary of the Treasury to require any others claiming nonresident aliens status
under the closer connection exception to file statements with the Secretary explaining the facts
supporting the alleged status. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(8).
194. This exception excludes days present in the United States for a brief time before arriving
in the United States or after leaving the United States if the alien has a closer connection to a
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test, Section 7701(b)(5) of the Code excludes days in the United States' 9 5
that the individual is a diplomat, 196 a teacher,1 97 a student, 198 a professional
athlete competing in a charitable event,' 99 or an alien who cannot leave due
to a medical condition occurring while in the United States.2 "° The final

exceptions are two transportation exceptions that do not count days present
in the United States when computing the substantial presence test.20 '
Under both tests, however, an alien is a resident only as of the first day
that she is present in the United States.2 °2 An alien may elect residence if
she is both present in the United States for thirty-one days and seventy-five
percent of the remaining days in the year (starting with the first of the
thirty-one days), and if she is a resident the following year pursuant to the

substantial presence test.20 3

foreign country. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(2)(C)(i); see also H.R. RaP. No. 432, supra note 162, at 1524,
1529-30; JoINT COMM. ON TAXATION STAFF, supra note 162, at 464, 470-71.
195. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(5)(A).
196. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(5)(A)(i). An individual is a foreign governmental-related individual if
he is temporarily present in the United States (I.R.C. § 7701(b)(5)(B)) and is a diplomat from a
foreign country (I.R.C. § 7701(b)(5)(B)(i)), an employee of an international organization (I.R.C.
§ 7701(b)(5)(B)(ii)), or a member of the immediate family of either (I.R.C. § 7701(b)(5)(B)(iii)).
International organizations are defined in .LR.C. § 7701 (a)(18) and include all international organizations "entitled to enjoy privileges, exemptions, and immunities as an international organization under the International Organization Immunities Act (22 U.S.C. §§ 288-288f)." Pursuant to
the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, these people are exempt from transfer taxes on
all property except real estate located in the United States. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, art. 39-4, 23 U.S.T. 3245-46.
197. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(5)(A)(ii). A teacher is an alien present in the United States pursuant to
the Immigration and Nationality Act (I.N.A.) definition. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(5)(C). The I.N.A.
definition of a teacher is found in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(15)(J) (1988); see also I.R.C. § 7701(b)(5)(E)(i).
198. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(5)(A)(iii). A student is an alien present in the United States pursuant
to the I.N.A. definition. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(5)(D). The I.N.A. definitions of a student are found in
8 U.S.C. § 1101(15)(F), (), (M) (1988); see also I.R.C. § 7701(b)(5)(E)(ii).
199. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(5)(A)(iv).
200. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(3)(D)(ii). If an individual is in the United States for medical treatment
for a health condition that arose while she was in this country, those days will not count toward
the substantial presence test. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(3)(D).
201. First, exclude days that commuters from Canada or Mexico are employed in the United
States. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(7)(B). These aliens are admitted as United States immigrants on a daily
basis. 8 C.F.R. § 211.5 (1992). Second, exclude days that the alien is temporarily in the United
States while travelling from one point outside the United States to another point outside the
United States. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(6)(B). An example of this would be a flight from Canada to
South America stopping at John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York. H.R. CONF.
REP. No. 861, supra note 161, at 967.
202. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(2)(A).
203. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(1)(A)(iii), (b)(4). There do not appear to be, however, any tax advantages of electing residence status.
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If the alien qualifies under either the green card or the substantial presence test the following year, residence is continuous. 20 4 Furthermore, in
her last year of residence, the alien resumes her nonresident status the first
day she is no longer in the United States by either test.205
Congress was concerned about resident aliens leaving the United States,
selling their United States situated assets, and returning to the United States
while avoiding tax.2 0 6 Therefore, Section 7701(b) provides that if an alien is
a resident for three consecutive years and is a resident in one of the next
20 7
three years, she will pay taxes in the intervening years at a higher rate.
The main advantage of an objective test is certainty.20° Objective tests
provide certainty to taxpayers, planners, litigators, judges,2 09 and the IRS.
Furthermore, certainty provides consistency of results.21 0 There are, however, several problems with the objective standards contained in Section
7701(b) of the Internal Revenue Code. The substantial presence test is tremendously complex with many mechanical calculations and numerous exceptions. Consequently, many aliens have difficulty understanding and
complying with the tax laws. 21 ' Practitioners can easily plan around the
substantial presence test. An individual can avoid passing the substantial
presence test by merely staying out of the United States for the requisite
number of days. Although objective, the arbitrary standard of 183 days is
subject to abuse. Suppose an individual operates a seasonal business during
the months of March, April, May, and June, and occasionally stays in the
United States for Fourth of July celebrations. If he is in the United States
for 122 days the first two years, he can avoid residence by again limiting his
stay to 122 days in the third year. 12

204. H.R. REP. No. 432, supra note 162, at 1528; JoINT COMM. ON TAXATION STAFF, supra

note 162, at 469.
205. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(2)(B)(i). If, however, the alien is a resident the following year under
either test, the residence is continuous. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(2)(A)(iii).
206. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 861, supra note 161, at 967.
207. See I.R.C. § 877.
208. See supra part III A, and notes 160-61 and accompanying text.

209. Lynch v. Commissioner, 273 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1959).
210. See supra part III A, and note 161 and accompanying text.
211. Tax Law Simplification and Improvement Act of 1983, supra note 43, at 328, 329 (state-

ment of representatives from Arnold & Porter, a law firm).
212.
1st year:
2nd year:

122 X one-sixth
122 X one-third

=
=

3rd year:

122 days X 1

= 122.00

20.33
40.67
183.00 days

See supra notes 189-90 and accompanying text.
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Interpretive problems result when the alien excludes days in the United
States for medical treatment for a health condition that arose while she was
in the United States.2" 3 The legislative history indicates that this condition
may not be pre-existing when entering the United States, but the term preexisting condition is unclear. Although the regulations state that the individual has a pre-existing condition if she has knowledge of the condition
when she enters the United States,2"' the regulations fail to define the term.
For example, would it be a pre-existing condition if an alien has a minor
heart condition that she knows of when she enters the United States but the
condition subsequently worsens to the point that she is hospitalized due to a
heart attack? Addressing questions of this type adds further complexity to
the substantial presence test. The only guidance available is a congressional
report that states "an individual who is in a serious automobile accident
shortly before a planned departure date" will not receive medical aid due to
a pre-existing medical condition.21 5 This aspect of the objective standard
fails to advance the policy of certainty.
Another difficulty with the substantial presence test is its inflexibility. If
the most extraordinary circumstances do not fit within the rule or one of its
exceptions, they are unfairly disregarded.2" 6 Although some commentators
have called for an objective standard of residence for transfer tax purposes
similar to the substantial presence test,2 17 such a test would cause problems.
Would the test be based on the country of residence when an alien died, as
with Section 7701(b), or would it be based on a formula involving the
number of years the decedent was a United States resident? Furthermore, a
substantial presence test would require two layers of analysis: determining
which years count and determining which days count to form those years.
There are minor problems with the green card test. An individual may
relinquish his green card, but may remain illegally in the United States.2 18
Alternatively, a permanent resident who has accumulated great wealth in
the United States could relinquish her green card and leave the United
States with her assets shortly before death, thereby denying the United
States estate tax jurisdiction.
213. See I.R.C. § 7701(b)(3)(D); supra note 200 and accompanying text.
214. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701(b)-3(c)(2), 52 Fed. Reg. 34,234 (1987).
215. H.R. REp. No. 432, supra note 162, at 1526; JoINT COMM. ON TAXATION STAFF, supra
note 162, at 466.
216. See, eg., Nienhuys v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1149 (1952). In Ntenhuys, the decedent, a
Dutch citizen who clearly did not intend to remain in the United States, would nevertheless have
been a United States resident under the substantial presence test even though he was unable to
return to the Netherlands due to Nazi Germany's occupation. Id.
217. See, eg., Fellows, supra note 138, at 752.
218. See, eg., Prop. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701(b)-4 (ex. 3), 52 Fed. Reg. 34,238 (1987).
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With collection matters, the Section 7701(b) tests work well for income
tax purposes. The payors of United States source income2 19 to nonresident
aliens must withhold2 2 ° a flat tax of thirty percent.2 21 However, it is unclear how such a scheme of withholding would work for the estate tax.
An objective standard for income tax purposes is more revenue neutral
than an objective standard for transfer tax purposes. Although Congress
estimated that the objective standards of Section 7701(b) would produce
approximately ten million dollars in revenue through the income tax, 22 2 it
did not design the objective standard to produce revenue.22 3
Finally, the transfer taxes are a tax on class while the income tax is a tax
on mass. 224 Because transfer taxes tax wealth derived from accumulated
income, the stakes of each case are higher, which means individuals will be
more likely to employ effective estate planning techniques to manipulate an
objective standard. For example, an alien could avoid residence for transfer
tax purposes by purposefully failing the substantial presence test. Fewer
aliens subject to the transfer taxes would hinder the policies of wealth redistribution and tax progressivity.
Objective standards produce mixed results. Although an objective standard similar to the substantial presence test would not work, the green card
test causes fewer problems.
C. The Hybrid Standard of Citizenship
Under the current scheme of transfer tax jurisdiction, all citizens of the
United States, regardless of residence, are liable for transfer taxes on their
worldwide assets.2 25 It makes no difference whether the decedent owned
any assets located within the United States.2 26
The unique aspect of the citizenship standard is that it contains both
objective and subjective elements. It is objective to the extent that one can
219. I.R.C. § 861(a).
220. I.R.C. § 1441(a).
221. I.R.C. § 871(a).
222. The estimates were for five million dollars in 1984, with ten million dollars for each year
thereafter. H.R. REP. No. 432, supra note 162, at 1531; JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION STAFF,
supra note 162, at 472.
223. Tax Law Simplification and Improvement Act of 1983, supra note 43, at 160 (statement
of Ronald A. Pearlman, Deputy Assistant Secretary (Tax Policy), Department of the Treasury).
224. JOINT COMM. ON THE ECONOMIC REPORT, supra note 37, at 691 (testimony of Louis
Eisenstein).
225. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(a) (1958) (estate tax); Treas. Reg. § 25.2501-1(a) (1958) (gift

tax).
226. The first record of Congress mentioning the citizen/alien or resident/nonresident distinctions is in the Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 98, § 62, 42 Stat. 227 (1921).
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determine whether the individual satisfies the country's criteria for nationality. It is subjective to the extent that one must have the intent to end or
change citizenship in addition to committing expatriating acts pursuant to
that country's criteria.2 27 Since it is objective to gain and subjective to lose,
it is a hybrid standard.
In general, citizenship is the bond that unites a person to a given country, constituting her membership in a particular country and giving her a
claim to its protection while subjecting her to its laws. 228 Despite the expansion of protection afforded aliens, 22 9 citizenship remains central to the

very definition of a social and political community.2 3 ° Citizenship is the
231
strongest standard of allegiance, providing "the right to have rights.1
The Code does not provide a definition of citizenship and the regulatory
definition is not instructive; rather, it merely refers the analyst to the rules
for immigration and naturalization.2 32 Therefore, one can only ascertain
the definition of citizenry by looking at the Constitution, the Immigration
and Nationality Acts, 233 and judicial interpretations.
The Constitution provides for citizenship either through birth in the
United States or through the naturalization process. In the words of the
Fourteenth Amendment, "all persons born or naturalized in the United
States... are citizens of the United States. '234 Therefore, one's birth in the
United States will result in estate tax liability.
Naturalization is the process by which a person, born a citizen of one
country, obtains the status of citizenship in another country.23 5 Everyone
has the right to change one's nationality to the nationality of another willing country.23 6 If, for example, a properly naturalized United States citizen
visits his original country of citizenship, he is protected by the United States
from any punishment by his former country,2 37 which could include the
imposition of transfer taxes after a sudden death. In granting the conditions of naturalization, a country may often fix the conditions of forfeiture

227. See, eg., Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252 (1980); Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
228. CHARLES G. FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 301 (4th ed. 1965).

229. This increased protection of aliens from the acts of the individual states finds its roots in
the Equal Protection Clause. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
230. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
231. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 (1958).
232. Treas. Reg. § 1.1-1(c) (as amended in 1974).
233. An alien is negatively defined as anyone who is not a citizen of the United States. 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (1988).
234. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
235. FENWICK, supra note 228, at 305.
236. FENWiCK, supra note 228, at 309 & n.54.
237. FENWICK, supra note 228, at 308 & n.49.
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by either denaturalization or expatriation. And, if denaturalization 238 or
24°
expatriation2 39 occurs, the country does not have to reinstate citizenship.
Although the Constitution mentions naturalization,2 4 1 the Founders left the
procedural details to Congress.2 4 2
Naturalized citizens have all the rights and privileges of native born
United States citizens.24 3 Even if the statute from which citizenship is derived is later repealed, the individual continues to be a citizen. 244 The most
common form of naturalization is through birth outside the United States
to a parent 245 or parents 24 6 of United States citizenship. If an individual
fulfills the naturalization requirements,2 47 she must affirmatively act to declare allegiance by taking an oath of allegiance to the United States.2 48
238. See 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1988).
239. See 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (1988).
240. FENWICK, supra note 228, at 306.
241. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 empowers Congress "[t]o establish an uniform Rule of
Naturalization."
242. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972);
United States v. Ginsberg, 243 U.S. 472 (1917).
243. Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964).
244. Karp, supra note 107, § 13.02[2].
245. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(d), (e) (1988) provide for citizenship if an individual is born outside the
United States to one parent who is a U.S. citizen and the parent was physically present in the
United States for one year. Furthermore, 8 U.S.C. § 1431 (1988) states that if one parent is a
citizen while the other parent is an alien, the child becomes a U.S. citizen if, before the child
reaches 18 years of age (1) the alien parent becomes a naturalized U.S. citizen while the child is
unmarried, or (2) the child resides in the United States pursuant to green card status and does so
during the alien parent's naturalization process.
246. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(c) (1988) provides for citizenship if an individual is born outside the
United States to parents who were U.S. citizens and one of the parents previously had a U.S.
residence.
247. To become a citizen, the alien must:
(1) speak and understand English (8 U.S.C. § 1423(a)(1));
(2) understand the basics of U.S. government (8 U.S.C. § 1423(a)(3));
(3) be of good moral character (8 U.S.C. § 1427(a));
(4) believe in constitutional principles (8 U.S.C. § 1427(a));
(5) have physical residence in the United States for at least five years (8 U.S.C.
§ 1427(a)(1));
(6) continuously reside in the United States from the date of filing the petition for naturalization until actual admission as a citizen (8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(2));
(7) possess a green card (8 U.S.C. § 1429); and
(8) be at least 18 years of age (8 U.S.C. § 1445(b)(1)).
248. In addition, 8 U.S.C. § 1448 (1988) states that the individual must pledge:
(1) to support the Constitution of the United States;
(2) to renounce all allegiance to any foreign sovereignty of whom the applicant was previously a citizen;
(3) to support and defend the Constitution and other laws of the United States against all
enemies, foreign and domestic;
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In addition to providing rules for naturalization, Congress has also legislated rules for denaturalization.2 49 However, courts have more closely
scrutinized denaturalization rules than naturalization rules. As indicated in
a series of cases, once an alien becomes a United States citizen, Congress
cannot easily deprive him of that status. The Supreme Court, in Afroyim v.
Rusk,2 50 held that an individual may lose United States citizenship only by
renunciation or certain acts. The State Department concluded that
Afroyim lost his United States citizenship by voting in a foreign political
election, which violated Section 401(e) of the Nationality Act of 1940.251 In
reinstating Afroyim's citizenship, the Supreme Court noted that Congress
cannot strip a person of his citizenship in the absence of a voluntary relinquishment on the citizen's part.2 2 Thirteen years later, in Vance v. Terrazas,25 3 the Court defined voluntary relinquishment as an expatriating act
accompanied by an intent to terminate United States citizenship.2 5 4
Congress codified the voluntary relinquishment standard ofAfroyim and
Terrazas by detailing seven ways in which an individual may voluntarily
relinquish his citizenship.2"' The burden of proof is on the party claiming

(4) to bear true faith and allegiance to the U.S. Constitution and other laws of the United
States; and
(5) when required by law, to bear arms on behalf of the United States, to perform noncombat service, or to perform work of national importance under civilian direction.
249. Congress derives its power to provide rules for denaturalization from U.S. CONsT. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 4. See Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265 (1961).
250. 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
251. Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, § 401(e), 54 Stat. 1137, 1168-69. Section 401 was reenacted as § 349 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163, 267-68.
In 1978, Congress eliminated the provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act that dealt
with the expatriation of persons who vote in foreign elections. Pub. L. No. 95-432, §§ 2, 4, 92,
Stat. 1046, 1046 (1978); see also Steven S. Goodman, Protecting Citizenship: Strengthening the
Intent Requirement in Expatriation Proceedings, 56 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 341, 346 n.22 (1988).
252. Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 268.
253. 444 U.S. 252, 263 (1980).
254. Id.
255. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (1988) states that an individual may lose his citizenship by voluntarily performing any of the following acts with the intention of relinquishing his U.S. citizenship:
(1) applying and obtaining naturalization in a foreign country;
(2) taking an oath or making an affirmation or other formal declaration of allegiance to a
foreign country;
(3) serving in the armed forces of a foreign country, either against the United States or as
an officer;
(4) working for a foreign government after either acquiring foreign nationality or taking
an oath, affirmation, or declaration of allegiance;
(5) formally renouncing one's citizenship before a U.S. diplomat or consular officer in a
foreign country;
(6) during war, making a formal renunciation of nationality in the regulatory prescribed
form; or
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the individual is no longer a citizen 25 6 (in nontax cases, it is usually the
government) by a preponderance of the evidence,25 7 with ambiguities resolved in favor of citizenship.25 8
The termination of citizenship has several consequences. The foremost
nontax consequence is statelessness-a person who has been denaturalized
lacks the protection of any country in the world.2 5 9 The transfer tax consequence is a loss of United States taxing jurisdiction,2 6° which will hinder
several policies, such as the redistribution of wealth. 2 6'
Congress has endorsed the citizenship standard for transfer tax purposes, legislating two provisions that use citizenship as the jurisdictional
standard exclusive of the subjective standard of domicile: expatriation to
avoid estate tax2 62 and denial of the marital deduction for property passing
to a noncitizen spouse.2 63 Code section 210724 prevents expatriation to
avoid the estate tax. It deals with the potential abuse when a citizen expatriates herself just before she is about to die to avoid the estate tax.
Previously, if an individual who had been a United States citizen relinquished her citizenship and became a nonresident alien before dying, the
IRS could not impose an estate tax on her estate. 265 Although few persons
would expatriate to avoid taxes, Congress thought some persons might, and
wanted to remove any possible incentive.2 66 Rationalizing that "[i]n these
(7) committing treason against or by use of force to overthrow the United States government or by violating laws dealing with conspiracy to overthrow or levy war against the
U.S.
256. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(b) (1988).
257. See United States v. Matheson, 532 F.2d 809, 818 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823
(1976).
258. See Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717, 733 (1952).
259. Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 268 (1967).
260. This assumes, of course, that the expatriate is no longer a domiciliary.
261. Just as with the domicile standard, despite the lack of a discernible causal connection,
the use of the hybrid standard of citizenship is correlated to the policy of redistribution of wealth.
See The Richest People in America, supra note 132, at 189.
262. I.R.C. § 2107.
263. I.R.C. §§ 2056(d), 2056A.
264. Section 2107 has a counterpart for the gift tax. I.R.C. § 2501(a)(3)(B) denies the exemption of I.R.C. § 251 l(a) that nonresident aliens have on gifts of intangible property located in the

United States. Thus, the gift tax applies to expatriates who give stock of United States corporations (I.R.C. § 251 1(b)(1)) or the debt of either United States persons (I.R.C. § 251 l(b)(2)(A)) or
the United States government (I.R.C. § 251 1(b)(2)(B)).
265. 1966-2 C.B. 1059; S.REP. No. 1707, supra note 90, at 1097. For a case dealing with the
IRS's failure to impose an income tax on a tax motivated expatriation prior to the Foreign Investors Tax Act of 1966 (FITA), Pub. L. No. 89-809, 80 Stat. 1539 (1966), see Dillin v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 228 (1971), acq. 1975-2 C.B. 1. In Dillin, an expatriated cash method taxpayer
avoided income tax by receiving payment after he expatriated himself. Id.
266. Removal of Tax Barriersto Foreign Investment in the United States, supra note 77, at 21.
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cases the wealth of the expatriate generally would have been accumulated in
the United States and therefore is properly subject to the regular United
States estate tax rates,"2' 67 Congress wanted to impose the burdens and responsibilities of estate taxation that come with the benefits of citizenship.
Paralleling comparable income 2 68 and gift2 69 tax provisions, Section

2107 imposes different situs rules for the property of a nonresident alien
dying within ten years of losing United States citizenship if one of the principal purposes270 of the loss was the avoidance of United States taxes.2 7 1 In
determining the expatriate's gross estate, the provision includes only property situated in the United States, which Section 2107 redefines to include
any United States situated property in certain foreign corporations owned
by the decedent.27 2
For example, a wealthy United States citizen with a disease leaving her
with only three years to live may desire to avoid estate taxes. If she puts all
her United States assets into a corporation that is incorporated in a tax
haven country and expatriates herself to the tax haven country, Section
2107 will treat her assets as though they were situated in the United States
instead of as part of the foreign corporation. Section 2107 does not apply to
certain types of expatriates whose loss of citizenship occurs under circumstances where it is unlikely that tax avoidance was a principal purpose.2 73
These include some of the methods of expatriation listed in the Immigration
and Nationality Act.2 74
267. Removal of Tax Barriersto Foreign Investment in the United States, supra note 77, at 21.
268. See I.R.C. § 877.

269. See I.R.C. § 2501(a)(3).
270. The principal purpose standard introduces some subjectivity, which is consistent with
the hybrid standard of citizenship.
271. S. REP. No. 1707, supra note 90, at 1097, 1099; 1966-2 C.B. 1059.
272. If the decedent directly owned 10% of the foreign corporation or indirectly owned 50%
of the foreign corporation, I.R.C. § 2107(b) treats the estate as including that percentage of the
fair market value of the foreign corporation's assets that are situated in the United States.

273. S. REP. No. 1707, supra note 90, at 1098; 1966-2 C.B. 1059. The IRS has the further
burden of establishing the reasonable belief that the expatriate's loss of United States citizenship
would result in a substantial reduction of estate, inheritance, legacy, and succession taxes. If
established, the administrator of the expatriate's estate must carry the burden of proving that the
loss of citizenship did not have as one of its principal purposes the avoidance of United States
income, estate, or gift taxes. I.R.C. § 2107(a).
274. Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 12, 79 Stat. 911 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1101-1525 (1988)). I.R.C. § 2107(d) excludes loss of citizenship due to the provisions of the
Act that the Supreme Court has repealed.
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At Congressional hearings, interested parties criticized Section 2107 as
too harsh.2 75 Nevertheless, its citizenship standard works well by limiting
planning opportunities. For all practical purposes, unless a person wants to
expatriate her assets into a noncorporate form,27 6 she must live a long
time-ten years-and have patience.
Although legislative history indicates that Section 2107 was not supposed to conflict with treaties,2 77 the IRS's interpretation currently overrides United States transfer tax treaty obligations by discriminating against
aliens who were formerly citizens. Revenue Ruling 79-152278 dealt with the
income tax counterpart to Section 2107.279 The IRS ruled that a treaty's
savings clause, which allows a country to tax its own citizens however it
wants, would allow the IRS to tax because the expatriation provision treats
nonresidents as citizens. Even though critics of the ruling argue that the
savings clause does not apply to a country's former citizens,28 the IRS
could apply the same rationale to transfer tax treaties. A small change to
the expatriation provisions would eliminate the potential override.2 81 Congress could merely amend Section 2107282 to provide that if a United States
citizen dies within ten years after losing citizenship and if one of the principal purposes of the expatriation was the avoidance of tax,283 the individual
is still a United States citizen for tax purposes. Because the treaties determine citizenship pursuant to local law,2 84 the savings clause would prevent
an override.
The second estate tax tool involving citizenship is the denial of the marital deduction for property passing to noncitizen spouses pursuant to Sec-

275. E.g., Removal of Tax Barriersto Foreign Investment in the United States, supra note 77,

at 156-57 (statement of representatives from the Association of the Bar of the City of New York,
Committee on Taxation).
276. A taxpayer may effectively expatriate her future estate's assets by: (1) obtaining debt
obligations of foreign obligors, regardless of where the evidence of indebtedness is located; (2)
depositing money in foreign banks; (3) making I.R.C. § 1031 like-kind exchanges of United States
real estate for foreign real estate; or (4) obtaining tangible personalty with a foreign situs.
277. S. REP. No. 1707, supra note 90, at 1059 (opening remarks of Rep. Wilbur Mills); 19662 C.B. 1059.
278. 1979-2 C.B. 237.
279. I.R.C. § 877.
280. See, e.g., Sidney I. Roberts, Is Revenue Ruling 79-152, Which Taxes an Expatriate's
Gain, Consistent with the Code?, 51 J. TAX'N 204 (1979).

281. Congress legislated that no part of the Foreign Investors Tax Act of 1966 (Pub. L. No.
89-809, 80 Stat. 1539), such as the expatriation provisions, would apply if contrary to a United
States treaty obligation. H.R. REP. No. 1450, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1966).

282. In the interest of symmetry, Congress would also have to similarly amend I.R.C. § 877
and § 2501(a)(3).
283. The amendment should apply to the income, estate, and gift tax.
284. 1980 Model Treaty, supra note 73, art. 3(2).
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tions 2056(d) and 2056A of the Code. Unlike Section 2107, Sections
2056(d) and 2056A are based on a domestic estate planning tool-the marital deduction.
The marital deduction was originally created to equate the size of estates in common law property states with those in community property
states.28 5 In 1981, Congress increased the marital deduction to allow an
unlimited deduction for property passing to the surviving spouse, regardless
of the property laws of the state.2 86 The policy behind the unlimited marital deduction is that the IRS will ultimately receive the estate tax when the
survivor dies.287
The marital deduction reduces the estate tax liability of the first spouse
to die by increasing the survivor's estate. However, the unlimited marital
deduction sparked a planning technique whereby the decedent's estate
would take a marital deduction for property passing to an alien spouse, who
could subsequently leave the United States; the property would then escape
United States estate tax completely.28 8
Congress recognized this potential for abuse when legislating the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act (TAMRA) of 1988.289 It sought to
prevent an alien surviving spouse from taking back to her homeland assets
of her decedent spouse's estate without paying any tax. This was accomplished by eliminating the marital deduction for property passing to her.2 9 °

285. Since community property states mandate that half of any wealth accumulated belongs
to the estate of the nonearning spouse, the earning spouse's estate was only half of what it would
be in a common law property state. Congress designed the marital deduction to treat estates in
common law property states in a manner identical to those in community property states by
allowing the decedent spouse's estate in a common law property state to decrease the gross estate
for up to half of any property passing to the surviving spouse. JAMES B. LEWIS, THE MARITAL
DEDUCTION 21 (1984).
286. I.R.C. § 2056(a); see also Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34,
§ 403, 95 Stat. 172, 301 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 2056 (1988)).

287.

STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE ECONOMIC RE-

COVERY TAX ACT OF 1981, at 233-34 (Comm. Print 1981). There are four elements of a marital
deduction. First, there must be a marriage. Rev. Rul. 67-442, 1967-2 C.B. 65. Second, the decedent spouse must pass property to the surviving spouse. I.R.C. § 2056(c). Third, when the decedent dies, she cannot transfer to her spouse property in which her interest may terminate. See
Shedd v. Commissioner, 237 F.2d 345, 350 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1024 (1957).
This is the so-called terminable interest rule, which planners can avoid only with a Qualified
Terminable Interest Property (QTIP) trust. I.R.C. §§ 2056(b)(7), 2523(f); see also Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2056(b)-l(g) (exs. 1-4) (1958). Fourth, the property must pass in a qualifying method of
disposition: either outright ownership, an estate remainder trust (Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(e)-2(b)(1)
(1958)), or a power of appointment trust. I.R.C. § 2056(b)(5).
288. Mary S. Gately, The Effect of ERTA on 'U.S. Domicile'for Estate and Gift Tax Purposes, 121 TR. & EsT. 44, 45 (1982).
289. Pub. L. No. 100-647, 102 Stat. 3342.
290. I.R.C. § 2056(d).
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The House of Representatives reasoned that property passing to a surviving
alien spouse undercuts the assumption behind the marital deduction of ultimate taxation of the property in the survivor's estate. It stated that the
assumption is only valid for surviving alien spouses who remain subject to
United States taxing jurisdiction by obtaining United States citizenship or
staying in the United States.29 I
The provision denies a marital deduction for property passing to a surviving spouse who is an alien.29 2 For example, suppose a United States
citizen has a bride from France who obtains a green card to live in the
United States. If the husband dies, his estate cannot take the marital deduction. By not allowing the marital deduction, this provision seems harsh in
that it may double tax a portion of the couple's property.2 9 3 However, there
are several methods of relief,294 the most prominent method being the use of
a Qualified Domestic Trust (QDOT). This technique allows the citizen decedent's estate to take the marital deduction if the property passes to the
291. H.R. REP. No. 795, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 592 (1988).
292. I.R.C. § 2056(d)(1). A similar rule denies the marital deduction for gift tax purposes
(I.R.C. § 2523(i)(1)), although Congress increased the annual gift tax exclusion from $10,000 to
$100,000 for property passing to an alien spouse. I.R.C. § 2523(i)(2). This does not make sense,
however, because gifts to the alien at the higher exclusion encourages gifts that are less likely to be
subject to United States estate tax. Furthermore, the $100,000 annual exclusion applies only if it
would qualify for the marital deduction had the alien spouse been a citizen, such as qualifying
under the terminable interest rules. H.R. REP. No. 247, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1430 (1989); SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 101ST CONG., lST SEss., REVENUE RECONCILIATION ACT OF 1989:
EXPLANATION OF PROVISIONS APPROVED BY THE COMM. ON OCT. 3, 1989, at 258 (Comm. Print
1989) (Sen. Lloyd Bentsen, Chairman). I.R.C. § 2523(a) no longer requires that the donor be a
United States citizen or resident. TAMRA also allowed an unlimited marital deduction to property in the estate of a nonresident alien, but only when it passed to a surviving citizen. I.R.C.
§ 2106(a). This equalizes the treatment of a nonresident alien with a citizen spouse to that of a
citizen or resident with a citizen spouse. H.R. REP. No. 795, supra note 291, at 593.
293. It is subject to U.S. tax in both his and her estate. It might also be subject to the inheritance tax in France.
294. Among the other methods, I.R.C. § 2013 is a relief provision giving credit for estate and
gift taxes paid on the same property within 10 years after the survivor's death. If the decedent had
predeceased the survivor by more than two years, the amount of the credit decreases by a percentage based on the number of years. To the extent that the decedent's estate is subject to tax in the
survivor's estate, the survivor's estate is entitled to the I.R.C. § 2013 credit regardless of the
number of years since the decedent died. I.R.C. § 2056(d)(3).
Also, the marital deduction is allowed (I.R.C. § 2056(d)(4)) if the survivor becomes a United
States citizen before the decedent's estate tax return is due and the spouse is a United States
resident (recall that Treas. Reg. § 1.20-1(b)(1)'s definition of domicile applies instead of I.R.C.
§ 770 1(b)'s definition of resident for income tax purposes) continuously from the decedent's death
until she obtains citizenship. I.R.C. § 2056(d)(4)(A).
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surviving alien spouse in a QDOT.2 95 If the citizen decedent failed to provide for a QDOT, the provision provides alternative measures.2 96
A valid QDOT has three requirements.2 9 7 First, the QDOT must contain at least one trustee who is either a United States citizen or corporation2 98 that has the right to withhold tax from any distribution.2 9 9 Second,
the QDOT must meet the conditions prescribed by the IRS to ensure the
collection of any QDOT tax." Third, the executor must make the elec-

tion.30 1 If the trust meets these requirements, the QDOT provision classifies events in one of two ways: nontaxable events or taxable events.

Nontaxable events include distributions of income, which are treated as
distributions from a trust pursuant to subchapter J of the Code.30 2 The
295. I.R.C. § 2056(d)(2)(A).
296. Before the decedent's estate tax return is filed, the executor or surviving spouse can
transfer (I.R.C. § 2056(d)(2)(B)(i)) or irrevocably assign (I.R.C. § 2056(d)(2)(B)(ii)) the property
to a QDOT. Congress wanted all property, probate and nonprobate, passing to an alien spouse to
qualify for the marital deduction if the property is transferred or irrevocably assigned to a QDOT
before the estate tax return is filed. Furthermore, if the executor or surviving spouse assigns
property to a QDOT, but fails to transfer it, the regulations should not allow the marital deduction. H.R. REP. No. 247, supra note 292, at 1430-31; SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, supra note
292, at 258-59. Also, either the executor or the surviving spouse can fie a reformation suit to
change a trust that does not qualify as a QDOT into a trust that qualifies as a QDOT before the
filing of an estate tax return for the decedent. I.R.C. § 2056(d)(5)(A)(ii). Because the provision
does not specify who may institute a suit for reformation, presumably either the executor or the
survivor may do so.
297. Although the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103
Stat. 2228 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), repealed the fourth requirement of all the income going to the alien spouse, the legislative history suggests that a QDOT has
to follow the QTIP rules (I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7)(B)(ii)) that require income payable annually. H.R.
REP. No. 247, supra note 292, at 1431 n.97. The TAMRA of 1988 required the following for a
QDOT: (1) all trustees are United States citizens or United States corporations; (2) the survivor
must receive all income, payable on a regular basis; (3) the trust must qualify under the regulations to be promulgated to ensure collection; and (4) the executor must elect to treat the trust as a
QDOT. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 386, supra note 77, at 668; see supra note 289 for TAMRA cite.
298. I.R.C. § 2056A(a)(1)(A). Therefore, an alien surviving spouse may be a trustee. Pursuant to the 1988 version, this was not possible because all trustees had to be United States persons
or corporations. Former I.R.C. § 2056A(a)(1).
299. I.R.C. § 2056A(a)(1)(B).
300. I.R.C. § 2056A(a)(2). The Conference Committee suggests that the regulations require
a portion of trust property to be situated in the United States or that the trustee be an institution
with substantial United States assets. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1104, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 115
(1988).
301. I.R.C. § 2056A(a)(3).
302. Income is defined in the same manner as I.R.C. § 643(b)'s definition of income, which
looks to the terms of the governing instrument and applicable local law. This would include
extraordinary dividends or taxable stock dividends that the fiduciary, acting in good faith, allocates to income. However, Congress has given the IRS the opportunity to promulgate regulations
defining income. I.R.C. § 2056A(c)(2) states: "Except as provided in regulations, the term 'income' has the meaning given to such term by section 643(b)."
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QDOT tax does not apply to any distributions of corpus to the survivor in
circumstances of hardship.3" 3
Almost every other event is a taxable event. 3°4 Nonhardship distributions of corpus before the survivor's death are taxable events.30 5 In addition, any payment by the QDOT of estate tax on distributions is also
taxable.30 6 Furthermore, the entire QDOT is subject to tax when the survivor dies, based on the value of the property in the QDOT3 0 7 when the citizen spouse died.30 Finally, a taxable event occurs when the QDOT
terminates.30 9
The IRS taxes the taxable events at the incremental Section 2001 estate
tax rates that would have been imposed had the citizen decedent's estate
included the distributed amount.3 10 The transfer tax regime employs Sections 2056(d) and 2056A as a collection device based on citizenship. The
trustee is personally liable for the QDOT tax and may only discharge per-

303. I.R.C. § 2056A(b)(3)(B). The executor must designate a United States citizen or corporation to file all returns and pay all tax. SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, supra note 292, at 260.
The hardship exemption replaced the House's idea of an exemption for distributions to health care
providers and up to an additional $100,000 of distributions per year. H.R. REP. No. 247, supra
note 292, at 1432.
304. Just as a noncitizen survivor can avoid the I.R.C. § 2056(d) denial of the marital deduction by becoming a citizen while maintaining continuous residence after the citizen spouse's death
(I.R.C. § 2056(d)(4)), the noncitizen can avoid a QDOT tax on distributions by doing the same
before any distributions. I.R.C. § 2056A(b)(12)(a), (b). If taxed QDOT distributions already occurred prior to the survivor becoming a citizen, the survivor may elect to treat those distributions
as gifts subject to the gift tax, thereby terminating the threat of any gift tax. I.R.C.
§ 2056A(b)(12)(C).
305. I.R.C. § 2056A(b)(1)(A).
306. I.R.C. § 2056A(b)(1 1).
307. I.R.C. § 2056A(b)(1)(B).
308. I.R.C. § 2056A(b)(2)(A)(i).
309. A QDOT terminates when either a trustee ceases to be a citizen or the trust fails to
follow the QDOT regulations. See I.R.C. § 2056A(b)(9); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1104, supra note
300, at 114-15; H.R. REP. No. 247, supra note 292, at 1429; SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, supra
note 292, at 257.
310. I.R.C. § 2056A(b)(2)(A)(i). The distributed amount includes previously distributed
amounts. Furthermore, if a decedent citizen leaves behind multiple QDOTs, the trustee should
use the highest rate in the year the citizen dies. I.R.C. § 2056A(b)(2)(C). The trustee should also
use this rate if the citizen's rate was not finally determined. I.R.C. § 2056A(b)(2)(B)(i). The
Conference Committee expected that a tax is not finally determined if, for example, the statute of
limitations for the citizen spouse had not lapsed, or a judicial proceeding regarding his estate tax
was pending. The IRS can finally determine a rate through a closing agreement. If the determined rate is less than the highest effective rate, the IRS will refund the difference, with interest.
See I.R.C. § 2056A(b)(2)(B)(ii); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1104, supra note 300, at 115. An I.R.C.
§ 2013 previously paid tax credit will apply to property taxed in the survivor's estate that was
subject to the QDOT tax.
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sonal liability pursuant to the standard discharge rules. 311 This will result
in the trustee using great care when ascertaining the citizenship of the
3 12

survivor.

When originally drafting Sections 2056(d) and 2056A, Congress did not
believe the provisions overrode the nondiscrimination articles of any treaties.3 13 At least one treaty partner, Germany, has thought that Sections
2056(d) and 2056A are an override. 3 14 The Germans argue that Section
2056(d) discriminates against surviving spouses who are foreign citizens in
that they must bear the full burden of United States estate tax on the property inherited. They further find the QDOT mitigator of Section 2056A to
be a costly and burdensome administrative provision that fails to provide
equal treatment to foreign surviving spouses and United States surviving
spouses.3 15
The German stance is incorrect while Congress's is correct. 3 16 The
treaty language states that citizens of the other state will not be subject "to
311. I.R.C. § 2056A(b)(1 1). I.R.C. § 2204 requires the trustee to apply for a written determination of tax liability, pay the tax, and post a bond. Furthermore, pursuant to I.R.C. § 6324, a
lien lasting for 10 years will attach to the estate of a decedent as if the decedent died on the date of
the taxable event. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1104, supra note 300, at 114.
312. Although the trustee ofa QDOT will generally not have to withhold tax on distributions
of QDOT corpus, she will have to withhold 10% (I.R.C. § 1445) of any distributions of U.S. real
property interests (I.R.C. § 897) and 30% of U.S. source income (I.R.C. § 861) if the surviving
spouse is a nonresident alien. I.R.C. § 871(a).
313. H.R. REP. No. 795, supra note 291, at 593. After discussing that the tax applies to the
estate of all decedents, regardless of citizenship, and not to beneficiaries, Congress noted that
citizen beneficiaries are not similarly situated with noncitizen beneficiaries because citizens pay
estate tax on their worldwide assets. However, if it applies to the beneficiaries, it is illogical for
Congress to say that it can discriminate against alien beneficiaries because it was Congress who
exempted the alien beneficiaries from estate taxation on their worldwide assets. Congress further
ignores that an alien spouse must first pay the QDOT tax to take full title to inherited property
while a citizen spouse can inherit property free of the QDOT tax.
314. Because of these provisions, the Bundestag Finance Committee tabled a draft bill required for German ratification of the German-United States Income Tax Convention of 1989.
Instead, the Bundestag Finance Committee directed the German Finance Ministry to obtain assurance from the United States that it would negotiate on matters they viewed as discriminatory
against German citizens. Hans H. Gattermann, US. Tax Treaty OverridesAre Unacceptable, 2
TAX NorTs INT'L 1238, 1310 (Dec. 1990). Freidhelm Jacob, Counsellor (Fiscal) at the German
Embassy, stated that although the U.S.-F.R.G. Estate Tax Treaty does not contain a nondiscrimination clause, the U.S.-F.R.G. Income Tax Treaty does contain a nondiscrimination clause that
applies to all taxes, including the estate tax. John Turro et al., Stalled U.S.-FR.G. Treaty Gains
Second Look in German Parliament;'Shadow' Talks Set with Taiwan, 47 TAX NOTEs 1420 (June
18, 1990).
315. Gattermann, supra note 314, at 1310.
316. Congress worried, however, that I.R.C. § 2056(d) and § 2056A would conflict with
treaty articles that gave domiciliaries of other countries a marital deduction based on the pre-1981
rules, but stated that tax treaties should not frustrate the internal revenue laws of the United
States. H.R. REP. No. 247, supra note 292, at 1435. Therefore, Congress delayed enactment of
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any taxation or any requirement connected therewith which is . ..more
burdensome" than that imposed on citizens of the taxing state.317 Unlike
the German transfer tax, which is an inheritance tax on beneficiaries,3 18 the
QDOT tax's use of the decedent's incremental estate tax rate3 19 on the value
when the decedent died 2 ' shows that the QDOT tax is a tax on the estate of
the decedent, not the surviving alien. Furthermore, the administrative requirements imposed on the QDOTs are requirements imposed on the estate
of the citizen decedent, not the surviving alien.32 1
Sections 2056(d) and 2056A have been further criticized due to their
complexity.3 22 The complexity, however, results from interaction with
other sections, and not with the basic scheme of denying the marital deduction on property passing to noncitizen spouses. Congress has worked to
improve this scheme323 rather than eliminate it, indicating that citizenship
oriented collection tools for transfer tax purposes are a trend of the future.
Although there are some potential problems with the citizenship standard, they seem more rectifiable than the problems inherent in some of the
tests contained in the objective and subjective standards. Constitutional
law does not place much emphasis on citizenship. Other than voting 324 or
becoming elected to United States office,325 which require citizenship, there
is no constitutional provision that requires ambassadors, judges, or other
governmental officials to be citizens.3 26 Accordingly, the Constitution generally protects any person within the United States, citizen or alien, resident
§§ 2056(d) and § 2056A so the Department of the Treasury could renegotiate those treaties that
the provisions override.
317. 1980 Model Treaty, supra note 73, at art. 10(1).
318. HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, supra note 25, at 703 & n.4.
319. I.R.C. § 2056A(b)(2).
320. I.R.C. § 2056A(b)(1)(B).
321. For example, I.R.C. § 2056(d)(2) states that the citizen decedent must pass the property
to the alien survivor in a QDOT (I.R.C. § 2056(d)(2)(A)), or the executor of the estate must
transfer or assign the property to a QDOT before the estate tax return is due (I.R.C.
§ 2056(d)(2)(B)).
322. See, e.g., Bernard L. Karr, New PlanningRequired for Surviving Spouses Who Are Not
U.S.Citizens, 70 J. TAX'N 140 (1989); Lloyd L. Plaine & Jeffrey W. Munk, New Estate and Gift
Tax Provisions Affecting Alien Residents and Nonresidents, 14 EsT., GIFrS & TR. J. 51 (1989);
Henry S. Ziegler, PracticalPlanningfor the Non-Citizen Spouse, 129 TR. & EST. 32 (1990).
323. The QDOT provision originated in the Senate in 1988. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1104,
supra note 300, at 114. Congress changed the QDOT provision in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 and revised it again in the OBRA of 1990. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388.
324. U.S. CONST. amends. XIV, XV, XXIV, XXVI.
325. The President must be a native United States citizen (U.S. CoNST. art. II, § 1, cl.5),
while members of Congress must merely be citizens (U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (members of the
House of Representatives); U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 3, cl. 3 (Senators)).
326. U.S. CONST. art. III.
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or nonresident.3 27 However, the Supreme Court has stated that taxation
3 28
based on foreign classifications passes the strict scrutiny standard,
thereby satisfying the due process provisions of the Fifth Amendment. a29
Another potential problem relates to the issue of dual citizens. These
are individuals having citizenship in two countries due to birth in one country330 to parents who are citizens of another country.3 3 1 Although the
traditional concepts of international law would give precedence to citizenship in the country of birth,3 32 with resultant current revenue shortfalls,
Congress is unlikely to relinquish taxing jurisdiction over a United States
resident born abroad to United States citizen parents. Furthermore, in
United States v. Matheson,3 3 3 the Second Circuit ruled that dual citizens are
subject to United States tax wherever they reside. Therefore, regardless of a
dual citizen's ties to and taxpayer status in another country, her estate is
subject to taxes in the United States. Although such a scenario, without the
benefit of a tax credit, 34 yields a harsh result, the dual citizen is entitled to
double benefits during her lifetime.
Lapsed citizenship poses a potential problem when a decedent, who mistakenly thought she was an expatriate pursuant to the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA),33 5 is later deemed a United States citizen through
the invalidation of the denaturalizing statute. Although citizens cannot lose
their citizenship through the repeal of a naturalization statute,3 3 6 it is possible to regain citizenship through the repeal of a denaturalization statute.3 37
In Revenue Ruling 75-357,338 the IRS ruled that someone whose citizenship
was reinstated due to a later found unconstitutional section of the INA was
liable for United States transfer taxes as a citizen.33 9 Commentators who
327. See Sam Andrews' Sons v. Mitchell, 457 F.2d 745, 749 (9th Cir. 1972); Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
328. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
329. Barclay & Co. v. Edwards, 267 U.S. 442, 449-50 (1924).
330. This is commonly known as jure soli. See FENWICK, supra note 228, at 302.
331. This is commonly known asjus sanguinis. See FENWICK, supra note 228, at 302.
332. FENwiCK supra note 228, at 303.
333. 532 F.2d 809 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976).
334. An estate can receive a credit in the United States through a treaty or I.R.C. § 2014.
335. Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 12, 79 Stat. 911 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1101-1525 (1988)).
336. Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 264 (1967).
337. In United States v. Lucienne D'Hotelle de Benitez Rexach, 558 F.2d 37, 42 (1st Cir.
1977), the court held that "[t]he rights stemming from American citizenship are so important
that, absent special circumstances, they must be recognized even for years past."
338. 1975-2 C.B. 5. Rev. Ruling 70-506, 1970-2 C.B. 1 provides a comparable ruling for
income tax purposes pursuant to I.R.C. § 877.
339. Under its authority pursuant to I.R.C. § 7805(b), the IRS decided to apply this ruling
without retroactive effect, beginning January 1, 1971.
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argue that retroactive taxation is unjustifiably unfair" miss the point that
these individuals would also be entitled to all benefits of United States citizenship during these years, such as the protection of tax treaties.
Using the hybrid standard of citizenship would not override existing
United States transfer tax treaties. Because United States transfer tax jurisdiction extends to all United States citizens and domiciliaries, Congress
would merely be removing the word "domicile" from the United States tax
scheme. Each United States transfer tax treaty provides for taxation of
United States citizens and United States domiciliaries, which each country
defines by its local law.341 Without a United States definition of domicile,
these treaties would lose all the revenue derived from the estates of aliens in
the United States. But because it would not impose United States transfer
taxes on aliens, the hybrid standard of citizenship would not override the
nondiscrimination clauses of any treaties.
A large percentage of noncitizens who possess green cards have no desire to become citizens. As this group of people living in the United States
continues to rise,34 2 the United States will continue to lose transfer tax revenues from those who consider the United States home, but have merely not
wanted to deal with the necessary administrative procedures to become citizens. A single hybrid standard of citizenship would relinquish transfer tax
jurisdiction over these aliens. Although most of the problems caused by the
hybrid standard of citizenship are rectifiable, the inability to tax aliens who
live in the United States, but who are not U.S. citizens, remains a problem.
V.

THE ARGUMENT FOR THE HYBRID STANDARD OF CITIZENSHIP
AND THE OBJECTIVE STANDARD OF GREEN CARD POSSESSION

For United States transfer tax purposes, jurisdiction is currently based

on the subjective standard of domicile or the hybrid standard of citizen-

340. See, e.g., American Bar Ass'n Sec. of Tax'n, Plan. Comm., Report on Exercise by the
Treasury Departmentand the InternalRevenue Service of the Authority Granted by InternalRevenue Code Section 7805(b) to Prescribe the Extent to Which Tax Rulings on Regulations Shall Be
Applied Without Retroactive Effect, 42 TAX LAW. 621 (1989); David W. Ball, RetroactiveApplication of Treasury Rules and Regulations, 17 N.M. L. REv. 139 (1987).
341. See, e.g., 1977 Model Treaty, supra note 73, art. 1(1); 1980 Model Treaty, supra note 73,
art. 1(1).
342. See Dawn Garcia, New Look to Immigration: Fewer Aliens Want to Be Citizens, S.F.
CHRON., Mar. 12, 1991, at 1. Furthermore, the number of naturalized citizens decreased from
242,038 in 1988 to 233,777 in 1989. UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION
SERVICE, STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE XXX-

vii (1989).
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ship.34 Congress could easily change jurisdiction to the objective standard
of green card possession (lawful permanent residence) or the hybrid standard of citizenship by redefining residence for transfer tax purposes to be
the green card standard and legislating away the regulatory definition of
domicile as residence.3 44 The green card test would plug the loophole
where immigrants try to avoid transfer taxes by choosing to obtain green
cards, but not citizenship. As a deterrent against illegal aliens 345 entering
the United States and avoiding transfer taxes, Congress should impose
transfer tax jurisdiction on their worldwide assets.3 46
The strongest argument favoring estate taxation based on citizenship
and green card possession is that an individual gaining governmental benefits as a citizen should pay a tax for those benefits. 347 Citizenship is a fundamental right, and a citizen has all the benefits and burdens of citizenship
regardless of whether she wants them. 34 8 Taxation is the price of those
34 a
benefits. As stated by the Supreme Court in Cook v. Tait:
The basis of the power to tax was not and cannot be made dependent
upon the situs of the property in all cases, it being in or out of the
United States, nor was not and cannot be made dependent upon the
domicile of the citizen, that being in or out of the United States, but
upon his relation as citizen to the United States and the relation of
the latter to him as citizen.350
A country such as the United States should be able to tax an individual
who derives the benefits of citizenship from the United States. These benefits include voting,351 holding United States political office, 352 travelling
with a United States passport, claiming the protection of United States laws
343. I.R.C. § 2001 imposes an estate tax on the gross estate of every decedent who is a citizen
or resident of the United States. The gross estate includes the value at the time of the decedent's
death of all property, real or personal, tangible, or intangible, wherever situated. I.R.C. § 2031(a)
(1988).
344. Because the United States transfer tax treaties refer to domiciliaries, as opposed to residents, a technical addition will have to provide for the definition of domiciliaries to be residents.
345. An illegal alien is an alien who does not have a green card or a temporary visa. 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1181, 1184 (1988).
346. While this approach would not affect the majority of illegal aliens, it would affect those
who had accumulated assets outside this country.
347. See United States v. Matheson, 532 F.2d 809, 819 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823
(1976).
348. Sheridan, supra note 145, at 231.
349. 265 U.S. 47 (1924).
350. Id at 56.
351. U.S. CONST. amends. XIV, XV, XXIV, XXVI.
352. See supra note 325; see also T. Alexander Aleinkoff, Theories of Loss of Citizenship, 84
MICH. L. Rnv. 1471, 1486 (1986).
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overseas, licensing from the Coast Guard to fly the United States flag on her
yacht duty free, and claiming the protection of tax treaties. 5 3
Other constitutional benefits and burdens of living in the United States
apply to all aliens-whether or not they possess green cards-as well as to
all citizens. It is unlikely, however, that a holder of a temporary visa would
have the same opportunity to take advantage of those benefits that a green
card holder would. Those benefits include freedom of speech3 54 and some
public assistance, 5 5 such as social security benefits.35 6 The burdens include
payment of social security taxes35 7 and registration for Selective Service.35 8
Of all categories of aliens, green card holders are more similar to citizens than are other categories. Green card holders can remain in the
United States indefinitely, just as citizens can. 35 9 Furthermore, green 36
card
1
3 °
holders can work in the United States and receive welfare benefits.
It is difficult for an alien to obtain a green card. In 1989, approximately
2.3 million aliens 362 sought one of the 270,000 green cards available. 363 It is

easier to obtain a temporary visa,364 but it is difficult to trade a temporary
visa for a green card.3 65

353. United States v. Matheson, 532 F.2d 809, 818 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 429 U.S. 823
(1976).
354. See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
355. See 45 C.F.R. § 2333.50 (1992).
356. 20 C.F.R. § 422.104 (1992).
357. I.R.C. § 3101.
358. 50 U.S.C. app. § 453 (1988).
359. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) (1988) states: The term "lawfully admitted for permanent residence" means the status of having been lawfully accorded the privilege of residing permanently in
the United States as an immigrant, such status not having changed.
360. Tawahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948).
361. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976). The government may, however, restrict welfare
benefits to those resident in the United States for five years, which would preclude those without a
green card from obtaining welfare benefits. Id.
362. UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, supra note 342, at
xviii.

363. See 8 U.S.C. § 1151(a) (1988).
364. The United States has an open-door policy on other types of visas because they are good
for the economy. UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, supra note
342, at xxxii.
365. To change from nonpermanent visa status to lawful permanent resident status, one of
the 270,000 green cards must first be available. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION LAWS: GENERAL INFORMATION 20 (1989). In addition, the applicant must:

(1) be inspected and either admitted or paroled into the United States;
(2) be the beneficiary of an approved petition (1-130 or 1-140);
(3) have not worked in the United States without INS permission after January 1, 1977;
and
(4) file an application on Form 1-485.
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Once an alien obtains a green card, she can easily obtain United States
citizenship. In 1989, the Immigration and Naturalization Service accepted
ninety-eight percent of the petitions filed for naturalization. 3" Possession
of a green card is a prerequisite for obtaining citizenship.36 7
Citizenship and green card possession provide objective criteria for
transfer tax jurisdiction that are simple to understand and apply. The subjective relinquishment element of citizenship is a hazard with which planners and other attorneys can easily live. Although commentators have
criticized objective tests for allowing sophisticated individuals to manipulate their affairs, 36 under this proposed standard such individuals cannot
avoid citizenship by any method short of expatriation. Two factors mitigate
the expatriation problem. The first is the general reluctance of individuals
to relinquish their citizenship. 369 The potential marginal wealth to be derived from expatriation rarely exceeds allegiance to the United States. The
second is the ten-year antiexpatriation provision of Section 2107, which allows avoidance only through patience.3 70
Emigration might cause problems in collecting the estate tax from the
estate of a former green card holder. A long-time green card holder, expecting to die, could relinquish her green card and return to her country of
citizenship to avoid taxation. However, Congress could avoid this problem
by subjecting green card holders to Section 2107.371 If an individual relinquishes her citizenship or her green card, her accumulated wealth in the
United States will remain with her no matter where she lives.3 72
The hybrid and objective standards produce both certainty and fairness.
Because the analyst can objectively determine if an individual has citizenship or holds a green card, it is certain. Because the tests tax individuals
The difficulty of changing status can be seen in the fact that only 27,874 nonpermanent visa holders obtained green cards in 1989. UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, supra note 342, at 8.
366. The INS denied only 5200 of the 227,692 petitions received. UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, supra note 342, at 90.

367. 8 U.S.C. § 1429 (1988). Furthermore, another prerequisite for citizenship--continuous
residence in the United States from the date of filing the petition for naturalization until actual
admission as a citizen (8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(2) (1988))-is generally only possible to fulfill through

holding a green card.
368. See Williams, supra note 41, at 1021.
369. Since Congress passed I.R.C. § 2107 in 1966, there have been no reported cases involv-

ing an I.R.C. § 2107 issue.
370. See supra notes 262-84 and accompanying text.
371. Treating aliens as citizens would avoid any conflicts with discrimination articles in treaties. See Tax Law Simplificationand Improvement Act of 1983, supra note 43, at 353 (statement of
attorney Marshall J. Langer).
372. Sheridan, supra note 145, at 234.
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based on the benefits they can obtain, it is fair. Although this dual standard
does not provide flexibility, it is worth the advantages.3 73
Jurisprudential reasons further support the hybrid standard of citizenship as a sound standard. Because the legal issues surrounding domicile
and the substantial presence test arise only in tax cases, the United States
always argues for expansive interpretations to increase its jurisdiction. The
United States has often litigated citizenship issues, arguing for a restrictive
definition 374 in order to strip individuals of their citizenship. Conversely, in
tax disputes, the United States will argue for an expansive definition of citizenship in order to increase its taxing jurisdiction.3 75 With the United
States having to argue each side of the citizenship standard at one time or
another, the law will likely develop in a more logical manner. A similar
analysis would apply to the green card test. Furthermore, consistency with
the jurisdictional standard for income tax purposes will aid the development of the standard. Because the green card test may not require physical
presence in a single year, but requires some presence over the course of
several years, it is a better standard of jurisdiction for transfer tax purposes
than for income tax purposes.
The introduction of the green card test would require Congress to revise
further the marital deduction provisions for property passing to alien surviving spouses.37 6 In general, this revision would deny the marital deduction for property passing from the estate of a decedent citizen or green card
holder to a spouse who is neither a citizen nor a green card holder. Making
green card holders subject to Section 2107 of the Code would avoid the
potential expatriation of surviving spouses who hold green cards.
Citizenship and green card possession standards have some use as collection tools. For example, the estate tax on QDOT distributions is similar
to the withholding tax of thirty percent 37 7 on payments of United States
source income37 8 to nonresident aliens.3 79
The hybrid standard of citizenship or the objective standard of green
card possession is the proper jurisdictional standard for international trans373. See H.R. REP. No. 432, supra note 162, at 1523; JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION STAFF,

supra note 162, at 463.
374. The exception would be treason cases, where the United States will claim citizenship and
then show that the acts were against that citizenship. See Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717
(1952).
375. See United States v. Matheson, 532 F.2d 809, 811 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823
(1976).
376.
377.
378.
379.

I.R.C.
I.R.C.
I.R.C.
I.R.C.

§§ 2056(d), 2056A.
§ 1441.
§ 861(a).
§ 871(a).
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fer tax purposes. Because green card holders are more similar to citizens
than are any other aliens, taxing them as residents supports many of the
policies an international transfer tax jurisdiction should embrace. The technical amendments to coordinate the standards with other provisions would
be worth the effort.
VI.

CONCLUSION

For transfer taxes, the United States currently imposes a dual international jurisdictional standard-domicile or citizenship. Although the citizenship standard, a hybrid that contains elements of both subjective and
objective tests, is satisfactory, the subjective standard of domicile has made
the law difficult to apply for planners and litigators. An objective standard
such as the substantial presence test of Section 7701(b) of the Internal Revenue Code is deficient due to its mechanical nature, but the objective standard of the green card test is efficient. Congress should maintain the
citizenship standard, but replace the regulatory definition of domicile with a
green card test. Although this change will necessitate some technical corrections, it will advance policies for taxes in general and policies unique to
both transfer taxes and international taxes.

